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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Boards of directors represent the interests of a dispersed community of firm 
shareholders who delegate the task of firm governance to this supervisory body. As 
firm ownership and control are inevitably separated in publicly listed firms, important 
decisions delegated to boards concern the CEO who manages the organization on 
behalf of shareholders. Shareholders expect management to act in their own interests 
and boards of directors are in charge of installing and motivating capable CEOs in 
order to encourage entrepreneurial decision making. Important tasks delegated to 
boards regarding the CEO include her selection and appointment, measuring, 
evaluating and rewarding her performance, and employment continuation as well as 
termination decisions. Among these tasks, especially CEO compensation is an issue of 
public opinion. Over the last two decades, the major fraction of CEO wealth has been 
influenced by movements in the value of firm equity, due to significant CEO holdings 
of firm shares and stock options. Establishing exposure of CEO compensation to the 
firm’s success on stock markets presumably results in incentive alignment between 
managers and owners. However, in view of CEO compensation packages that by far 
exceed annual payments received by the average employee issues with regard to the 
fairness, social responsibility and economic justification of such arrangements are 
debated by business press and academic research alike. 
 An important question raised is whether boards of directors effectively exert their 
imposed duties. Especially the dominance of simply providing CEO’s with firm equity 
to achieve incentive alignment casts doubt on whether this is the case and creates 
research opportunities with regard to the role of boards as the CEO’s main supervisory 
instance. For example, using the firm’s share price as the ultimate surrogate of CEO 
performance indicates that capital markets rather than boards of directors take on the 
primary role of evaluating CEO performance. This practice implies that boards 
determine levels of equity held by the CEO but assign performance evaluation and 
compensation decisions to investors who are likely to be less informed. Overall, this 
contradicts the underlying idea of delegating performance measurement and evaluation 
to boards of directors who are more informed than capital markets about important, yet 
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sensitive issues such as strategic positioning, new product development, and 
innovation.  
 In theory, other important decisions affecting the CEO rest upon boards, and 
these decisions are inevitably based on evaluations of the CEO. For example, boards 
dismiss the CEO and are unlikely to base this decision entirely on stock performance 
including investors’ expectations of the firm’s prospects. On the contrary, they hold 
more CEO related knowledge and can also ex-ante communicate what CEO 
performance evaluations are based on. Moreover, board evaluations of the CEO can 
convey new information to outsiders (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Hayes and 
Schaefer 2005).  
 This dissertation empirically explores the use and effects of CEO incentives 
created by boards beyond those resulting from her equity ownership. Using economic 
theory as the benchmark for evaluation, the following work compiles three empirical 
studies in an attempt to identify whether boards of directors use their information 
advantage over capital markets to influence CEO decisions by effectively and 
efficiently measuring and evaluating her performance. More specifically, the first 
study examines determinants of board discretion in assessing CEO performance, 
emphasizing the contracting value of information gained from monitoring the CEO 
and the ability of boards to exploit such information. The second study deals with the 
impact of board evaluations on incentives by examining its influence in the CEO’s 
firing decision. The third study investigates whether the board’s opportunity to include 
privately held information in CEO evaluation influences CEO decisions on dimensions 
that are difficult to measure but affect long-term firm value, using the example of firm 
innovation. 
1.2 Inferring board evaluations 
This dissertation aims at the determinants and effects of boards’ CEO performance 
evaluation decisions. For evaluations to influence behavior, CEOs need to have notion 
of what boards will emphasize in assessing performance before the action choice is 
taken. To empirically examine this matter, public data on what boards deem important 
in the CEO evaluation process is necessary. However, firms are not obliged to provide 
details of CEO performance evaluation to outsiders. To circumvent the problem, ex-
ante specifications of CEO performance evaluations are deducted from U.S. CEO 
annual bonus contracts described in the compensation section of SEC Proxy 
Statements (DEF 14a). 
 Numerous studies investigating the design of annual bonus contracts report that 
executive short-term bonuses are determined almost exclusively based on accounting 
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performance measures and privately observed measures, which indicates the relevance 
of boards monitoring the CEO (e.g. Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith 1996; Ittner, 
Larcker and Rajan 1997). Yet, the dominant role of equity compensation in CEO 
compensation has led researchers to question the incentive relevance of cash 
compensation in general, and bonus contracts in particular (e.g. Core, Guay and 
Verrecchia 2003). If short-term compensation contracts are used to provide incentives, 
the decisions made in this context must have other effects in how boards influence 
CEO actions beyond the role direct cash transfers play in achieving this. An appealing 
alternative is that boards of directors can use bonus contracts and their formal 
administration as a means to signal what elements the annual review of performance is 
comprised of. Actual cash payments made by the board consequently contain 
information about outcomes of the CEO’s performance review conducted by the 
board. This, in turn, is likely to affect other high-powered incentive components such 
as new grants of firm equity or the likelihood of CEO turnover. The compensation 
section of Proxy Statements includes detailed information about the ex-ante definition 
of performance measures and the extent to which board’s private information becomes 
relevant in evaluating the CEO.  
 Assuming that CEO bonus contracts represent CEO performance evaluation 
practices, I first focus on determinants of different approaches to CEO evaluation in 
chapter 2. In chapter 3, I test this assumption by investigating whether bonus contract 
specifications are systematically related to the relationship between firm performance 
and the CEO firing decision. I thereby also study if CEO performance evaluations and 
thus, bonus contracts provide incentives. In chapter 4, I examine whether boards’ 
performance evaluations influence CEO behaviour by studying their effect on firm 
innovation. 
1.3 Outline 
  In chapter two, the first study entitled Discretion and the Complexity of Simple 
Bonus Contracts is presented. I examine whether board discretion in the decision how 
observed CEO performance translates into rewards ex-post follows optimal 
contracting considerations or merely represents a means for the CEO to extract rents 
from the firm. Specifically, consistent with the first view, discretion gives boards the 
opportunity to adjust performance evaluations for unforeseen factors, and this 
informational advantage can be used to improve incentives. Consistent with the second 
view, discretion allows boards to evaluate the CEO in a way that is not transparent to 
outsiders and to raise performance evaluations beyond economic justifications. 
Previous studies provide little evidence on the extent to which discretion is driven by 
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either of these underlying views. In this study, I attempt to investigate whether this 
lack of evidence is, at least partly, driven by not differentiating between different types 
of discretion and associated benefits. I focus on two types of discretion: (1) the use of 
discretionary bonus adjustments in contracts solely based on earnings (implicit 
earnings-based contracts) and (2) the use of subjective weights in contracts based on 
multiple measures (implicit multi-measure contracts). In the context of these implicit 
contracts, I address the following two questions. First, what motives do boards have to 
write implicit contracts, and thereby condition bonus payments on their subjective 
evaluation of the extent to which ex-ante specified measures reflect an accurate picture 
of CEO performance? Second, do these motives for writing implicit contracts, as also 
the type of discretion used, change with specific contract configurations and associated 
contracting problems? I develop and test hypotheses corresponding to these questions. 
I argue that the benefit of filtering out external noise and the achievement of congruity 
between CEO actions and firm value are the primary drivers of discretion conditional 
on the main contracting problem at hand. Further, applying discretion is per-se 
difficult and requires relatively intense monitoring of the board. In line with this 
reasoning, I test the prediction that the potential benefits and thus the incidence of 
board discretion hinge on the board’s monitoring intensity.  
 An assumption underlying the first study is that CEO performance evaluation is 
relevant from an incentive perspective and that bonus contracts are informative of this 
evaluation. In Chapter 3, I test this assumption by focusing on how, if not via direct 
cash payments, the evaluation of the CEO spills over to other important governance 
decisions and thereby affects incentives. In the study Bonus Contracts, Private 
Information, and CEO Turnover, I address the question whether compensation 
related details given in annual bonus contracts represent performance dimensions used 
by boards of directors in administering CEO employment. Specifically, I investigate 
CEO continuation versus termination as an example of a governance decision which 
affects CEO incentives as well as shareholder interests. Equity compensation 
dominates CEO wealth, but nevertheless virtually all firms take care in administering 
bonus contracts whose designs even exhibit substantial differences across firms and 
industries. I argue that this observation occurs because more incentive relevant 
decisions are linked to bonus contracts apart from seemingly trivial bonus payments.  
 An important duty that shareholders delegate to corporate boards is to attract and 
fire the CEO. The aim of retaining her position provides significant incentives for the 
CEO, for instance due to foregone future salary payments and reputation losses. 
Directors frequently interact with the firm’s management, which makes them more 
informed about her actions and planned initiatives than investors can possibly be. 
Stock prices therefore contain no new information about CEO quality or effort, and 
prior empirical research supports this view (e.g. Engel, Hayes, and Wang 2003). The 
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decision to fire the CEO consequently rests upon board evaluations of CEO 
performance, and this linkage provides significant incentives. Identifying the 
importance of board evaluations in CEO firing therefore shows the importance of 
boards and their monitoring of executives in governing the firm. 
 I also examine whether investors respond to the informational differences 
associated with CEO firing. Specifically, the board’s dismissal of the CEO can vary 
with respect to the amount of private information leading to the decision. This results 
in different implications for investors when a CEO has to leave the company. A firing 
that is predominantly based on observable (e.g. accounting) performance shows 
investors that the board is still functioning, resulting in a positive signal. Conversely, if 
the firing is also based on private information, the capital market receives unexpected 
negative information about the CEO. Based on this, I predict stock price reactions 
around the announcement of a CEO to be positive if the board’s evaluation of her 
performance is predominantly conditioned on public information, and negative if it is 
(partly) conditioned on private information.  
 After focusing on whether the private information held by boards included in the 
CEO’s performance evaluation is related to high powered incentives in the form of 
employment continuation decisions, chapter 4 turns to the effects of these incentives. 
In the third empirical study, The Incentive and Signaling Effects of Annual Bonus 
Schemes: Evidence from Firm Innovation, I study the effects of boards’ private 
information in performance measurement and evaluation on firm innovation, using a 
sample of R&D intensive firms. Innovation is crucial for many firms who seek to gain 
competitive advantage by exploring new products, materials, or methods of 
production. Innovation does not instantly translate into measurable firm success and 
the firm’s accounting performance is unlikely to capture the value of promising 
projects. Providing equity incentives can thus be problematic, especially when firms 
are reluctant to disseminate sensitive information, for example in early stages of 
identifying innovative processes or products. This highlights the importance of boards’ 
annual performance evaluations undergone by CEOs who gain more information 
related to the value of innovation than capital markets (Lipton and Lorsch 1992; 
Bushman and Smith 2001). Innovation is representative of a situation where the 
assessment of desirable CEO initiatives is per-se difficult and this task is delegated to 
boards. I develop and test the hypothesis that CEO performance evaluations that take 
private information about value creation into account are positively related to firm 
innovation.  
 I further draw upon the notion that details of performance evaluations 
systematically translate into components of cash compensation (Chapter 2 and 3 of this 
dissertation). Investors can then deduct the value of innovation from observing actual 
cash payments received by the CEO and include this in forming expectations about 
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firm value (Hayes and Schaefer 2005). As a consequence, the firm’s stock price 
becomes more sensitive to the CEO’s innovative behavior, resulting in the increased 
intensity of given equity incentives and thus, greater CEO motivation to secure 
innovation. I test the hypothesis that CEO equity is associated with more innovation, 
in the presence of private measures included in CEO performance evaluation. 
Identifying whether this interplay is positively related to innovation shows when board 
evaluations and equity can be complements in providing incentives. 
1.4 Sample  
The samples of data used in this dissertation consist of U.S. publicly listed firms in the 
1998-2002 period included in the EXECUCOMP database and indicating to have the 
same CEO in this time span. Firm accounting, financial, and innovation information is 
gathered using COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and USPTO data, respectively. I read, together 
with two researchers, the Proxy Statements of all firms in the period of interest and 
coded the following details given: (1) The performance measures used in determining 
annual CEO bonuses; (2) whether realizations of CEO performance are measured by 
public sources (e.g. Residual Income, Net Earnings) or alternatively, result from the 
board’s monitoring of the CEO; (4) whether the relative weight of performance 
measures is set forth in an ex-ante defined formulaic approach or if boards choose to 
determine weightings ex-post, and (5) if a formula is used, the explicit weights 
attached to performance measures.  
  Chapter 2 employs 1,753 observations of 425 firms in the 1998-2002 period. 
Chapter 3 concentrates on 303 sample firms in 2001 replenished by 45 firms with the 
incidence of CEO dismissal after fiscal year 2001. Chapter 4 is based on 520 
observations from 197 R&D intensive firms in the 1998-2000 period. 
1.5 Contribution  
This dissertation contributes to the literature in a number of ways. It documents that 
multiple types of discretion exercised by boards exist. Distinguishing between these 
types is important, as different types of discretion can be a remedy for different 
contracting problems, which earlier related work has ignored so far. Moreover, this 
dissertation indicates that the choice of discretion follows optimal contracting rather 
than rent extraction considerations, and shows that boards invest special diligence in 
their task of reviewing and evaluating CEO performance.   
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 This dissertation further examines the incentive effects of board evaluations. 
Board evaluations are systematically related to the CEO firing decision. In that way 
the presented findings add to the discussion concerning why firms administer annual 
incentive programs. Outlining the procedure used in evaluating the CEO by means of 
annual bonus programs offers various advantages and provides incentives due to 
spillover effects on employment decisions. Results further indicate that stock market 
reactions to CEO turnover differ depending on the type of information used in 
governance decisions. This provides a plausible explanation for the mixed evidence in 
previous event studies in this area. 
 The following work also focuses on effects of incentives provided by board 
evaluations by analyzing their impact on firm innovation. Until so far, accounting 
studies have predominantly investigated the impact of CEO incentives on R&D 
spending, ignoring that these investments do not per-se yield innovation. The analysis 
presented here is novel as it shows that boards monitoring and evaluation of the CEO’s 
innovation oriented behavior is important to secure innovation. Furthermore, this 
dissertation includes one of the first studies to empirically examine whether cash 
compensation signals private information to the capital market. It adopts the Hayes 
and Schaefer (2005) argument stating that stock prices are far from being perfect 
surrogates of firm value if disseminating all sensitive information to investors in too 
great detail is infeasible from the firm’s perspective. Empirically testing this argument 
yields important implications both from a theoretical as well as managerial point of 
view. 
1.6 Structure of the dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the 
study on the determinants of board discretion in annual CEO performance evaluation. 
Chapter 3 presents the study on the role of performance evaluation performed by 
boards in the CEO firing decision. Chapter 4 treats the incentive effects of board 
evaluations on firm innovation. Chapter 5 concludes and summarizes this dissertation. 
9 
Chapter 2  
Discretion and the Complexity of Simple Bonus Contracts1 
Abstract 
In CEO incentive contracts, discretion (or subjectivity) by the board of directors is 
often present in one form or another. What is unclear, however, is whether this 
behavior reflects rent extraction or optimal contacting. I argue that discretion can 
improve incentive contracting by addressing two important considerations: (1) risk 
reduction and (2) congruity improvement. I distinguish between discretion being 
applied in bonus contracts solely based on earnings (implicit earnings-based contracts) 
and discretion being applied in bonus contracts based on multiple measures (implicit 
multi-measure contracts). I argue that, in an earnings-based contract, the benefit of 
discretion is its ability to reduce risk by subjectively adjusting for uncontrollable 
factors and this benefit is more likely to be exploited the greater the noise in 
accounting earnings. In a multi-measure contract, the benefit of discretion is its ability 
to reduce noncongruity by subjectively weighting these measures ex-post and this 
benefit is more likely to be exploited the greater the difficulty of predicting the optimal 
course of action ex-ante. I therefore expect that, conditional on the use of only 
accounting information (accounting and nonaccounting information), the use of 
implicit contracts is positively associated with accounting noise (environmental 
unpredictability). Finally, I expect that the ability to exploit the benefits of discretion 
depends on the monitoring intensity of the board. The empirical results based on 
incentive contract data for 424 CEOs of U.S. public firms are consistent with my 
expectations and show that the use of discretion is driven by optimal contracting 
considerations. 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on a working paper co-authored with Frank Moers. 
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2.1 Introduction 
In this study, I examine the determinants of discretion in CEO annual bonus contracts.2 
From an economic perspective, firms use CEO incentive contracts to align the 
executive’s interests with those of their owners. In these contracts, discretion (or 
subjectivity) by the board of directors is often present in one form or another.3 In 
observed business practice, there are multiple examples of important subjective 
components, such as CEOs being evaluated on non-quantifiable aspects of the job or 
boards deciding on how performance will be translated into rewards ex-post. 
Proponents of the managerial power theory claim that these forms of discretion are 
examples of rent extraction (e.g. Bebchuk et al. 2002) and this view has also been 
expressed in the press (e.g. Morgenson 2006). An alternative view is that boards’ 
choice of discretion reflects optimal contracting. Given that boards of directors play a 
crucial role in governing the firm, it is important to better understand the reasons for 
using discretion. Consistent with the optimal contracting perspective, I show that 
boards use discretion in an attempt to resolve contracting problems. 
 Previous studies provide little evidence on the extent to which discretion is 
driven by economic determinants. I argue that this lack of evidence is, at least partly, 
driven by not differentiating between different types of discretion and associated 
benefits. In this chapter, I focus on two types of discretion: (1) the use of discretionary 
bonus adjustments in contracts solely based on earnings (implicit earnings-based 
contracts) and (2) the use of subjective weights in contracts based on multiple 
measures (implicit multi-measure contracts). In the context of these implicit contracts, 
I address the following two questions. First, what motives do boards have to write 
implicit contracts, and thereby condition bonus payments on their subjective 
evaluation of the extent to which ex-ante specified measures reflect an accurate picture 
of CEO performance? Second, do these motives for writing implicit contracts, as also 
the type of discretion used, change with specific contract configurations and associated 
contracting problems? 
 There are two important considerations in designing incentive contracts: the risk 
premium to be paid to a risk averse agent and the extent to which the contract achieves 
goal congruence between the principal and agent. I argue that discretion can play an 
important role in incentive contracting by addressing the problems of risk and 
                                                 
2 Although the annual bonus represents a small fraction of a CEO’s total compensation, it reflects the 
performance assessment by the board of directors of the CEO. Understanding the way in which boards assess the 
performance of the CEO is important because it is very likely that this assessment affects other, high-powered 
incentive components, such as equity grants and the likelihood of CEO turnover. 
3 I use the terms “discretion” and “subjectivity” interchangeably throughout this dissertation. 
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noncongruity. If a single performance measure is used because it is a sufficiently 
perfect representation of the economic consequences of the agent’s actions, then the 
remaining contracting problem is one of risk caused by performance measure noise 
(Feltham and Xie 1994). In this case, the principal can apply discretion to adjust for 
the effect of uncontrollable factors and make the contract implicit, the benefits of 
which are increasing in the level of noise. I therefore expect that, conditional on the 
use of a single performance measure, the choice of implicit contracts (discretionary 
bonus adjustments) is positively associated with the noise in the single performance 
measure. 
 If multiple performance measures are used, then an important contracting 
problem is how to weight these measures to assure congruity with the principal’s gross 
payoff. One of the choices that needs to be made in this respect is whether to fix the 
weights ex-ante or allow for discretion ex-post. The benefit of keeping the weights ex-
ante implicit is that relevant pre-decision information that will only be observed after 
the contract has been signed can be incorporated in rewarding the CEO using ex-post 
subjective weights. This informational advantage is more prevalent the less predictable 
the environment, because increased unpredictability makes it more difficult to 
establish the optimal course of action ex-ante. I thus expect that, conditional on the use 
of multiple performance measures, the choice of implicit contracts (subjective 
weights) is positively associated with environmental unpredictability. 
 Despite the above-mentioned benefits, there are also costs associated with the use 
of implicit contracts, which explains why we do not observe implicit contracts all the 
time for all firms. Most of the costs relate to the mere use of implicit contracts, such as 
problems of reneging, favoritism, and bias (e.g. Baker et al. 1994; Prendergast and 
Topel 1996; Moers 2005). In addition, there are problems that relate to the extent to 
which the benefits of discretion can be exploited. In this chapter, I focus on this lack of 
benefits. In order for the implicit contract to be valuable, the use of discretion should 
either lead to a reduction in risk or a reduction in noncongruity. I argue that the ability 
to achieve these reductions, and thus exploit the benefits of discretion, depends on the 
intensity with which the boards of directors monitor. The lower the monitoring 
intensity the less able the board is in interpreting what they observe and thus the less 
likely discretion will improve incentive contracting. As a result, I expect that the effect 
of noise and environmental unpredictability on the use of implicit contracts is 
moderated by the monitoring intensity of the board of directors. 
 To test my predictions, I use an extensive dataset based on compensation contract 
information retrieved from 1998-2002 SEC proxy statements. The data provide me 
with information on the performance measures specified for deriving annual bonuses 
and whether their application in the compensation decision is regulated formulaically 
(explicit contract) or allows for discretion (implicit contract). In line with expectations, 
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I find that the incidence of implicit contracts is positively related to (1) the noise in 
accounting earnings, once accounting measures are the sole performance measures 
specified and (2) the extent of environmental unpredictability, once the firm combines 
accounting and nonaccounting measures. I further find strong evidence that monitoring 
intensity of the board of directors increases the effect of noise on implicit contracts, 
but only moderate evidence that it increases the impact of environmental 
unpredictability. Finally, additional analyses and numerous robustness checks 
corroborate the above findings. 
 I contribute to the literature in several related ways. Despite the prevalence of 
discretion, there is only limited empirical evidence of the determinants of its use. Most 
of the previous empirical studies in this area examine the existence or extent to which 
discretion is applied without distinguishing between different types of discretion 
(Murphy and Oyer 2003; Gibbs et al. 2004; Ederhof 2007).4 In a similar vein, even 
though previous research states that there are different types of benefits to using 
discretion (Murphy and Oyer 2003), no attempt has been made to disentangle these 
benefits. I contribute to the literature by conceptually and empirically showing that 
different types of discretion create different types of benefits and that making this link 
is important to be able to explain board discretion. I further contribute to the literature 
by providing evidence that economic arguments underlie the use of discretion in 
incentive contracts. I show different types of discretion are used to address different 
contracting problems and these contracting problems depend on the choice of 
performance measures. Finally, I show that, in addition to distinguishing different 
types of discretion, it is important to separate uncontrollability (noise) from 
unpredictability in incentive contract design. 
 The remainder of the second chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2, I 
discuss the theory and develop the hypotheses. In section 2.3, I describe the sample 
selection, method, and variable measurement and in section 2.4 I discuss the empirical 
results. Finally, in section 2.5, I provide a conclusion. 
2.2 Theory and hypotheses 
2.2.1 Benefits and types of discretion 
Casual observation of actual practice and prior studies on incentive contracting 
indicate that accounting performance measures play an important, and often exclusive, 
                                                 
4 See Moers (2005) for an exception. 
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role in CEO compensation decisions (Bushman et al. 1996; Ittner et al. 1997).5 Given 
the importance of accounting information, I focus on motives of boards of directors to 
deviate from explicit bonus contracts that are exclusively written on accounting 
numbers and to introduce discretion in the performance appraisal process. In general, 
there are three benefits associated with discretion by boards of directors (Murphy and 
Oyer 2003): (1) reduce CEO’s exposure to risk, (2) reduce distortions caused by 
quantitative performance measures, and (3) promote adaptive behavior. Discretion can 
thus improve incentive contracting by addressing the dominant contracting problems 
of risk reduction and congruity improvement (Feltham and Xie 1994). 
 Although discretion can improve contracting, it can be applied in different ways. 
In particular, the literature identifies three important types of discretion by boards of 
directors (Baker et al. 1994; Ittner et al. 2003; Gibbs et al. 2004): (1) discretionary 
bonus adjustments, (2) explicit bonus pay on subjective performance measures, and (3) 
subjective weights on multiple performance measures. In terms of contract design, 
these types of discretion can be formulated as follows. 
 )()(1 ⋅++=⋅ DAws β        (Contract s1) 
 SPMAws 212 )( ββ ++=⋅       (Contract s2) 
 yAws )()()( 213 ⋅+⋅+=⋅ ββ       (Contract s3) 
where w is a fixed wage, βi is the explicit incentive weight on performance measure i, 
A is accounting performance measure, D(·) is the discretionary bonus adjustment, 
SPM is subjective performance measure, βi(·) is the subjective (implicit) incentive 
weight on performance measure i, and y is non-accounting performance measure. The 
question that has not been addressed so far in the literature is why boards use one type 
of discretion instead of another, or whether it matters at all?6 I argue that each type of 
discretion is linked to especially one of the benefits. In the following, I specifically 
argue that Contract s1 is used for risk reduction, Contract s2 for reducing distortions 
caused by quantitative measures, and Contract s3 for promoting adaptive behavior. 
                                                 
5 There are several reasons why accounting information is important in incentive contracting. First, accounting 
data are readily available for purposes other than incentives and are therefore relatively costless for incentive 
purposes. Further, accounting earnings are quantitative, verifiable by third parties, and conservative in nature, all 
of which improve their usefulness for contracting (see e.g. Watts and Zimmerman 1986). In addition, Sloan 
(1993) argues that earnings can shield executives against market risk inherent in firms’ stock prices. Finally, 
accounting earnings are highly aggregated, ultimately capturing the effects of all managerial actions, and are 
therefore valuable in addressing the incentive problem caused by delegation (Moers 2006). 
6 I acknowledge that combinations of the three contracts are possible. However, the three contracts described, are 
consistent with the contracts generally observed in practice, there is a theoretical reason for why this is so (as I 
argue next), and I provide empirical evidence consistent with these arguments. I return to this issue later in the 
chapter. 
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2.2.2 Discretion and risk reduction 
If there is a contractible performance measure that is sufficiently congruent, i.e., a 
sufficiently perfect representation of the economic consequences of the agent’s 
actions, then the sole use of this performance measure can direct the attention of the 
agent in the right direction. In settings where the CEO’s actions have predominately 
contemporaneous performance effects rather than future performance effects, 
accounting earnings can be thought of as sufficiently congruent. Explicit incentive 
contracts solely based on accounting information can then be effective, though not 
necessarily efficient. For discretion to improve incentive contracting, it needs to 
address the remaining contracting problem of risk reduction and thereby increase 
efficiency. 
 The potential inefficiency of earnings-based contracts centers on the noise in 
accounting earnings. The analytical literature indicates that supervisor discretion can 
be a solution to the noise inherent in objective performance measures. For example, 
Baker et al. (1994) show that contracts written on a noisy objective measure can be 
improved if the principal has (unverifiable) information about actual noise realizations 
and subjectively determines compensation based on that signal. Boards gain 
knowledge about uncontrollable and ex-ante non-contractible events that occur during 
the measurement period and that impact accounting earnings. If the board conditions 
rewards on this knowledge, through the use of discretionary bonus adjustments 
(Contract s1), they can reduce the CEO’s compensation risk. 
 An alternative to the use of discretionary bonus adjustments to reduce risk could 
be to use explicit pay based on the board’s subjective assessment of the noise 
realizations (Contract s2). The only difference between these two contracts would be 
that explicit pay fixes the bonus adjustment, while discretionary bonus adjustment 
provides the option to adjust. The option to adjust, however, is valuable to meet the 
CEO’s reservation wage when his outside employment opportunities are associated 
with uncontrollable changes in the market (Oyer 2004; Rajgopal et al. 2006). Given 
the non-negative value of this option, discretionary bonus adjustments are preferred 
over explicit pay based on subjective judgments for the purpose of risk reduction. 
 Although discretion can reduce risk caused by performance measure noise, this 
risk reduction benefit might be offset by an increase in risk caused by problems that 
can occur once discretion is allowed, such as reneging, favoritism, and bias (Baker et 
al. 1994; Prendergast and Topel 1996; Moers 2005). As a result, the use of 
discretionary bonus adjustments is more likely to improve incentive contacting the 
greater the benefits of reducing performance measure noise, and these benefits are 
greater the noisier the measure. Based on the above discussion, I state the following 
hypothesis. 
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H1: In earnings-based contracts, the use of discretionary bonus adjustments 
is positively related to the noise in earnings. 
2.2.3 Discretion and congruity improvement 
In case earnings are far from being sufficiently congruent, the addition of a more 
diverse set of performance measures can be optimal (e.g. Holmstrom 1979; Feltham 
and Xie 1994). Empirical evidence shows that the use of nonfinancial measures and 
subjective judgments are valuable when accounting numbers fail to immediately 
capture the effects of all important managerial actions (e.g. Bushman et al. 1996; Ittner 
et al. 1997; Banker et al. 2000; Gibbs et al. 2004). If boards decide to supplement 
earnings with alternative measures, a critical issue in contract design is the weighting 
of these measures (Banker and Datar 1989; Ittner et al. 2003). Ceteris paribus, the 
principal prefers a weighting scheme that minimizes distortions and makes the overall 
performance evaluation of the agent congruent with the principal’s objective. 
 Most of the previous studies in the incentive area focus on the determinants of 
the explicit (relative) weights on different performance measure, including subjective 
judgments, i.e., Contract s2 (e.g. Bushman et al. 1996; Ittner et al. 1997; Murphy and 
Oyer 2003). Instead, I focus on the problem that the principal has to decide to either 
use an objective, formulaic approach or leave the incentive weights on performance 
measures open to ex-post adjustment. While an objective formulaic approach avoids 
problems that can result from ex-post subjective evaluations, the rigidity of this 
approach can be problematic in unpredictable environments. Fixing the weights ex-
ante provides incentives for behavior that is not adaptive to changes in the 
environment. This is effective if the optimal course of action is known ex-ante, but can 
cause problems in fast-changing environments where responsive actions are required 
(Demsetz and Lehn 1985). As a result, in an unpredictable environment, the agent 
needs to take actions that are value enhancing but unknown ex-ante, which creates a 
demand for an incentive system that induces situation-specific adaptive behavior. 
 The use of discretion in weighting different performance measures ex-post 
allows for this adaptive behavior. The board can, in its weighting decision, incorporate 
relevant pre-decision information that it observes after the contract has been signed. 
Given this incorporation, the agent has incentives to similarly incorporate this pre-
decision information in his action choice in a congruent way. In sum, the benefits of 
flexibility in using diverse measures to derive compensation are high when boards 
know important performance dimensions but are unable to predict as to what 
constitutes good performance and which, and to what extent, CEO actions will affect 
firm value during the fiscal year. Accordingly, I state the following hypothesis. 
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H2: In multi-measure contracts, the use of implicit incentive weights is 
positively related to environmental unpredictability. 
2.2.4 Discretion and monitoring intensity 
As noted before, the use of discretion in incentives provides the principal with the 
opportunity to let her personal preferences play a role in the compensation decision. 
As such, the mere use of discretion is costly. Even if the principal is ‘honest’, 
discretion can be problematic, however. These problems relate to factors that limit or 
destroy the potential benefits of discretion. The benefits of discretion hinge on the 
accuracy of the observed unverifiable signal; the lower the accuracy of this signal the 
lower the benefits of using it to resolve contracting problems (Baker et al. 1994). 
Discretion can therefore be (too) costly if an honest and unbiased principal 
misinterprets performance data. 
 The probability that performance data are incorrectly interpreted is higher the 
less intense the board monitors. That is, a board that is characterized by a low 
monitoring intensity is less likely to interpret unverifiable signals correctly. In an 
earnings-based contract, this implies that the board can misinterpret the noise 
realizations and make discretionary adjustments that do not adjust for uncontrollable 
effects. In a similar vein, the board might misinterpret observed pre-decision 
information and choose incentive weights in a multi-measure contract that are 
inconsistent with the optimal action choice. Under rational expectations, these 
problems are taken into account in the ex-ante contracting choice, which implies that 
an increase in noise (environmental unpredictability) is less likely to lead to an implicit 
earnings-based contract (multi-measure contract) the lower the monitoring intensity of 
the board. As a result, I state the following two hypotheses. 
H3a: In an earnings-based contract, the relationship between the use of 
discretionary bonus adjustments and noise in earnings is less positive 
the lower the monitoring intensity of the board. 
H3b: In a multi-measure contract, the relationship between the use of implicit 
incentive weights and environmental unpredictability is less positive the 
lower the monitoring intensity of the board. 
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2.3 Sample, method and variable measurement 
2.3.1 Sample selection 
My analysis is based on CEO incentive contracts described in the compensation 
section of SEC Proxy Statements (DEF 14a). Proxy statements do not only provide 
information about specified performance measures but also whether boards of 
directors apply them in a formula or with subjective flexibility to derive compensation 
at the end of a fiscal year. My sample consists of publicly-listed firms included in 
EXECUCOMP without a change in the CEO position in the period from 1998 to 2002. 
I obtain an initial sample of 2,895 observations for 579 firms across the five years. 
 The full sample initially reduces to 2,575 observations due to three sources of 
missing compensation-related information: lacking proxy information (63 obs.), 
companies not administering annual incentive programs (127 obs.), and missing 
indication of performance measures (130 obs.). I merge the remaining observations 
with stock market and financial statement data obtained from COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP, by firm and fiscal year, which reduces the sample to 2,073 observations due to 
missing information. Finally, missing board of directors’ information leads to the loss 
of additional 320 observations, resulting in a final sample size of 1,753, for 424 firms 
across five years in 11 different industries, as classified by two-digit SIC code. 
 My main research interest lies in board motives for choosing inside two different 
performance measure constellations: implicit contracts with respect to (1) earnings or 
(2) multiple diverse measures. Therefore, I divide the initial sample into the two 
subsamples EARNINGS and DIVERSE. To determine these subsamples and to create 
the dependent variables of interest, all individual proxy statements were separately 
read by me and two researchers. There were only a small number of differences in the 
classifications (approximately 5% of the sample), all of which were subsequently 
resolved. 
 The EARNINGS sample contains observations when the board bases (the 
explicit part of) the bonus entirely on earnings or an earnings-related measure. This 
sample (n=812) is derived  by focusing on named performance measures such as 
“Earnings per Share”, “ROA”, “ROE”, or “Residual Income”, as well as the indicators 
for earnings being the only measure specified (“exclusively”, “only”, no appearance of 
other measures). The DIVERSE sample encompasses contracts in which boards 
employ a combination of earnings and alternative non-accounting measures (n=941). 
In addition to the mentioned earnings indicators, I search for words such as “Quality”, 
”Efficiency”, “Customer Satisfaction”, “New Product Development”, “Leadership”, 
and “Strategic Positioning”. 
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2.3.2 Dependent variables 
To test the research hypotheses stated, two dependent variables capture board 
discretion in performance measure application. I define a binary variable for discretion 
in each of the subsamples EARNINGS and DIVERSE. In Table 2.1, I provide a 
detailed overview of excerpts from proxy statements corresponding to compensation 
contracts in EARNINGS and DIVERSE and whether I code these contracts as implicit 
(IMPL_EARN=1; IMPL_DIVERSE=1) or explicit (IMPL_EARN=0; 
IMPL_DIVERSE=0).  
 In the subsample EARNINGS, I measure IMPL_EARN as an indicator variable 
that takes on the value 1 if I identify a semantic structure that indicates that boards 
apply discretion in linking earnings performance to pay, and 0 otherwise. Examples of 
discretion include “[…], the bonus is not subject to a mathematical formula” and “[…] 
in awarding bonuses the board may, upon its sole discretion, increase or decrease 
bonus payments.”7 The mean of the dependent variable IMPL_EARN is 26.11 per cent 
(212 obs.). Of those contracts that disclose the option to use discretion, at least 33.33% 
actually exercise this option. This percentage is an underestimate if firms explicitly 
disclose when they exercise discretion to increase bonus payments but refrain from 
doing so when they make downward discretionary adjustments.8 The use of 
discretionary bonus adjustments is obviously not restricted to earnings-based contracts. 
I do observe the use of these adjustments in the DIVERSE subsample. The incidence 
of discretionary bonuses in the DIVERSE subsample, however, is only 12.98% and is 
significantly lower than the incidence in the EARNINGS subsample (p<0.01 two-
tailed). 
 This finding is consistent with the argument that adding performance measures 
that are informative can also have risk reduction effects (e.g. Feltham and Xie 1994), 
which reduces the need for discretion for the purpose of risk reduction. 
 In the subsample DIVERSE, I measure IMPL_DIVERSE as an indicator variable 
that takes on the value 1 if boards leave relative weights on diverse measures implicit, 
and 0 otherwise. I search for semantic structures that indicate that the board does not 
formulaically use diverse performance measures for bonus determination. Examples 
include “these factors are considered subjectively without specific weight to any item” 
and “in awarding bonuses, the board may choose among performance measures it 
considers important for assessing CEO performance”. I identify 753 observations 
(80.02%) where flexibility is applied in the use of diverse performance measures. 
                                                 
7 A common practice of boards is the specification of earnings targets and resulting pay out schemes, which are 
characteristics of a formula bonus. Still, some boards explicitly indicate that they can overrule the formula 
outcome. In this case, the bonus is not court-enforceable and consequently implicit.    
8 This observation signals that using ex-post measures of discretion can be problematic (see e.g. Ederhof 2007). 
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2.3.3 Independent variables 
 I measure NOISE based on the variability in the median 3-digit industry 
accounting returns. Higher fluctuations in accounting returns of the median firm in a 
respective industry are assumed to proxy for the extent to which firm accounting 
performance is vulnerable to factors beyond a manager’s control (Ittner et al. 1997). I 
include the variability in ROA, ROE, and ROS over five years preceding the proxy 
data. Principal component analysis reveals one factor with eigenvalue greater than 
unity. I use the factor score as the measure of noise (cf. Ittner et al. 1997). 
 Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Core and Guay (1999), I proxy for the 
degree of environmental unpredictability by using return volatility. The volatility in 
returns is driven by changes in expectations and thus the greater the volatility the less 
predictable the environment. I measure the standard deviation of the residuals from a 
market-model, i.e., a regression of a firm’s monthly stock returns on the CRSP value-
weighted index estimated over period of 12-60 months prior to the proxy data. I 
subsequently take the natural logarithm of the standard deviation to arrive at my 
measure (UNPREDICTABILITY). 
 I measure the monitoring intensity of the board of directors by computing a 
factor score including board size, the proportion of busy outside directors, and the 
proportion of busy inside directors. My arguments to include these items are driven by 
the claim that they reflect a lack of time and board dialogue needed for discretion to be 
applied correctly.9 Board size is presumed to be associated with a lack of dialogue and 
difficulty in reaching consensus (Lipton and Lorsch 1992). The more difficult it is to 
reach consensus the more likely it is that discretion will be based on inaccurate signals. 
I include the proportion of busy outside directors (i.e. directors with three or more 
directorships) and busy inside directors (i.e. directors with two or more directorships) 
as they often adopt a “one solution fits all” approach to exerting corporate control due 
to a lack of director time (Core et al. 1999; Larcker, Richardson and Tuna 2007). This 
approach is detrimental to the use of discretion because it lowers the ability of 
directors to correctly interpret performance data and hence will lead to assessments 
based on inaccurate signals. Further, as the number of busy outsiders increases, boards 
are inclined to become distracted and monitoring intensity is likely to suffer (Fich and 
Shivdasani 2006). Although the criteria determining director business (two or more 
directorships for inside; three or more directorships for outside directors) are set 
                                                 
9 Note that I make no claim that board size and the proportion of busy outside/inside directors are measures of 
poor corporate governance and less effective monitoring. I claim that they measure monitoring intensity and that 
it is optimal for a board with lower monitoring intensity to de-emphasize the use of unverifiable information 
(Petersen and Rajan 2002). 
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somewhat arbitrarily, I use these cutoffs for the following reasons. First, they reflect 
the recommendation by the Council for Institutional Investors concerning the 
maximum directorship of board members. Second, the definition at hand is consistent 
with prior work by Core et al. (1999), Ferris et al. (2003), Fich and Shivdasani (2006) 
and Larcker et al. (2007) who portrait monitoring problems associated with busy 
directors as defined by the two- and three-directorship threshold, respectively.10 
Principal component analysis reveals one factor with eigenvalue greater than unity. As 
monitoring intensity decreases with these measures, I take the inverse of the factor 
score to make sure that higher values of MONIT_INTENS imply more intense 
monitoring. 
2.3.4 Control variables 
In the analysis of the determinants of the use of discretion in earnings-based contacts, I 
control for firm size, the relative power of the CEO over the board of directors, 
industry, and year. In the existing literature, firm size has proxied for growth 
opportunities and the difficulties of monitoring an agent (Holthausen and Larcker 
1992; Gaver and Gaver 1993; Bushman et al. 1996; Core et al. 1999). I measure firm 
size by the natural logarithm of firm sales measured in millions of US Dollars 
(FIRM_SIZE). On the one hand, higher growth opportunities of the firm may require 
more discretion, as the impact of future investments may be difficult to grasp 
formulaically. On the other hand, larger firms are more complex in factors such as 
geographical dispersion and product diversity, rendering the board’s judgment of the 
CEO’s impact on firm value per-se difficult, making the incidence of discretion less 
likely. Overall, I formulate no directional prediction with regard to the effects of firm 
size on the decision for implicit performance measure application.  
 I further control for the possibility that CEOs possessing power over the board of 
directors may prefer contracts that are not administered by a formula and are 
consequently less transparent to outsiders. In that way, CEOs can exercise their 
influence and force a performance assessment for bonus determination that reflects a 
favorable picture of their actions during the measurement period. I compute the CEO 
power measure (CEO_POWER) as a three-item factor score including an indicator 
variable for CEO duality, the proportion of outside directors appointed by the CEO, 
and the proportion of inside directors appointed by the CEO.11 Principal component 
analysis reveals one factor with eigenvalue greater than unity. 
                                                 
10 Inside directors fulfill additional tasks in the firm and the detrimental effects of busyness on monitoring 
intensity are assumed to become evident at lower levels (i.e. two or more) of additional outside appointments 
compared to additional appointments held by outside directors (e.g. Larcker et al. 2007). 
11 Note that these items are the only three items that significantly load on the latent variable “CEOPOWER” in 
Ittner et al. (1997). 
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 In the analysis of the determinants of the use of discretion in multi-measure 
contacts, I control for CEO equity incentives in addition to controlling for firm size 
and CEO power. Murphy and Oyer (2003) expect that the effects provided by ex-post 
flexibility in weighting performance measures may be similar to those provided by 
equity incentives, as the market ‘weights’ the consequences of CEO actions in setting 
the firm’s stock price. I measure the variable EQUITY_INC by calculating the 
sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio to price using the method described in Core 
and Guay (2002). 
 Table 2.2 provides summary statistics of all variables for the total sample and the 
sub-samples EARNINGS and DIVERSE. To control for potential effects of outliers, 
all continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st, 99th percentiles. Table 2.3 presents 
Pearson correlations between the independent variables, none of which cause 
multicollinearity concerns. 
2.3.5 Empirical specification and estimation techniques 
Based on the hypotheses and the above description of variables, I estimate the 
following equations: 
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 For ease of interpretation, I center NOISE and UNPREDICTABILITY at the 
mean and rescale MONIT_INTENS in such a way that the coefficient for NOISE 
(UNPREDICTABILITY) in equation (2.1) ((2.2)) reflects the impact of NOISE 
(UNPREDICTABILITY) for the highest observed level of monitoring intensity. 
Following my hypotheses, I expect the coefficient α1 and α3 to be positive in both 
equations. 
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 I estimate equations (2.1) and (2.2) using three methods. First, I pool all 
observations and estimate a probit regression using firm-clustered standard errors. 
Second, I run annual probit regressions and calculate average coefficients and the 
corresponding Z-statistic. Finally, I use a bootstrapping procedure where I (1) 
randomly select a single observation for each firm, (2) estimate the probit regression 
for the randomly selected sample, (3) repeat this analysis for 1,000 random samples, 
and (4) estimate the average coefficients and corresponding bootstrapped confidence 
intervals. 
Table 2.2 
Descriptive statistics of variables in the total samples and the subsamples EARNINGS and 
DIVERSE. 
  TOTAL SAMPLE  
(n=1,753) 
 EARNINGS 
(n=812) 
 DIVERSE  
(n=941) 
Variable  Mean  St. Dev.  Mean  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev. 
IMPL_EARN  -  -  0.26  0.44     
IMPL_DIVERSE  -  -      0.80  0.40 
NOISE  0.00  0.98  −0.11  0.89  0.10  1.04 
UNPREDICT-
ABILITY 
 −2.25  0.39  −2.24  0.36  −2.25  0.41 
MONIT_INTENS  0.00  0.99  0.11  0.95  −0.09  1.02 
CEO_POWER  0.00  1.00  0.04  1.01  −0.04  0.99 
EQUITY_INC  5.60  1.63  5.60  1.60  5.61  1.65 
FIRM_SIZE  7.32  1.40  7.27  1.26  7.36  1.51 
The variables are defined as follows: 
IMPL_EARN = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the board applies discretion in linking 
earnings performance to pay, and 0 otherwise; 
IMPL_DIVERSE = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if boards leave relative weights on 
diverse measures implicit, and 0 otherwise; 
NOISE = Time series variability in median industry accounting returns measured five 
years prior to the proxy data. The factor score is calculated using variability 
of (1) return on assets, (2) return on sales, and (3) return on equity; 
UNPREDICT-
ABILITY 
= Extent of environmental unpredictability. Time series variability of monthly 
stock returns 60 months prior to the proxy data; 
MONIT_INTENS = Monitoring intensity of the board, calculated as the inverse of a factor score 
including (1) board size, (2) the proportion of busy outside directors, and (3) 
the proportion of busy inside directors, higher values implying more intense 
monitoring; 
CEO_POWER = CEO influence over the board of directors measured as a factor score of (1) 
the proportion of outside directors appointed by the CEO, (2) the proportion 
of inside directors appointed by the CEO, and (3) CEO duality; 
EQUITY_INC = The sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio to a 1% change in stock price; 
FIRM_SIZE = Natural logarithm of total firm sales (mio. US $). 
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2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Main analysis 
Table 2.4 presents the probit regression results for the probability of the use of 
discretion in incentive contracts solely written on earnings. The results of the pooled 
sample are shown in Column three. I find that noise in accounting earnings (NOISE) 
exhibits a positive and significant relationship with the likelihood of using discretion 
in earnings-based contracts. I further find a positive and significant interaction effect 
of NOISE×MONIT_INTENS. This indicates that the impact of noise on the 
probability of using discretion is more positive the higher the monitoring intensity of 
the board.12 All other independent variables have no significant effect on the 
probability of using discretion in earnings-based contracts. 
 Columns four and five of Table 2.4 show the results for the annual probit 
regressions and the random sample probit regressions. The results are similar to those 
for the pooled sample with one notable exception. That is, in the annual regressions, 
MONIT_INTENS has a significant positive effect on the probability of using 
discretion, which implies that, at the (sample) average level of noise in earnings, 
boards with higher monitoring intensity are more likely to use discretion. It should, 
however, be noted that this result hinges on the assumption of independence among 
years.13 
 Overall, my results are consistent with the expectation that discretion in the 
application of earnings is more likely the noisier the accounting numbers and that this 
likelihood is higher the higher the monitoring intensity of the board. The results thus 
provide strong support for hypothesis 1 and 3a. 
 Table 2.5 reports the probit regression results for the likelihood of implicit 
incentive weights in incentive contracts based on both accounting and non-accounting 
information. The results of the pooled sample, shown in Column three of Table 2.5, 
show that my environmental unpredictability proxy (UNPREDICTABILITY) is 
positively associated with the probability of applying implicit incentive weights. Thus, 
the greater the unpredictability the more likely the use of implicit incentive weights, 
which is consistent with expectations. The interaction of unpredictability and 
monitoring intensity (UNPREDICTABILITY×MONIT_INTENS) is positive and 
                                                 
12 As explained by Ai and Norton (2003), interpreting the coefficient on the interaction term in a probit model 
can be problematic, since the sign of this coefficient need not be identical to the sign of the marginal effect for 
each observation. Additional analysis based on the Ai and Norton (2003) procedure shows that our results are 
not troubled by this potential problem. More specifically, the marginal effect of the cross-partial is positive for 
more than 99% of the individual observations, 97% of which is statistically significant. 
13 Further analysis indicates that it takes approximately three independent years (out of five) for the coefficient of 
MONIT_INTENS to be significant. 
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significant, which is consistent with the expectation that the impact of unpredictability 
is more positive the higher the monitoring intensity of the board.14 
 Further, contrary to expectations, EQUITY_INC has a significant positive impact 
on using implicit weights, suggesting that equity incentives and implicit weights are 
used in a complementary manner to trigger adaptive CEO behavior. The other control 
variables are not significant at conventional significance levels. 
                                                 
14 Additional analysis based on the Ai and Norton (2003) procedure corroborates these findings and shows that 
the marginal effect of the cross-partial is positive for 97% of the individual observations, 15% of which is 
statistically significant. 
Table 2.4 
Probit estimations of the choice of discretionary bonus adjustments in earnings-based contracts 
 Predicted Pooled Sample Annual Samples Random Samples 
NOISE + 0.311** 
(0.039) 
0.572*** 
(0.000) 
0.331*** 
(0.001) 
MONIT_INTENS ? 0.090 
(0.407) 
0.183** 
(0.047) 
0.064 
(0.458) 
NOISE×MONIT_INTENS + 0.325*** 
(0.003) 
0.537*** 
(0.000) 
0.309*** 
(0.000) 
CEO_POWER ? 0.050 
(0.591) 
0.047 
(0.378) 
0.027 
(0.642) 
FIRM_SIZE ? −0.063 
(0.552) 
−0.062 
(0.262) 
−0.054 
(0.380) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes - Yes 
Firm-clustering  Yes - - 
Pseudo R2  4.2% 7.8% 6.6% 
Sample size  812 152 – 186 185 – 207 
***, ** is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively (one-tailed for predictions, two-
tailed otherwise). P-values reported in parentheses. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
NOISE = Time series variability in median industry accounting returns measured 
five years prior to the proxy data. The factor score is calculated using 
variability of (1) return on assets, (2) return on sales, and (3) return on 
equity; 
MONIT_INTENS = Monitoring intensity of the board, calculated as the inverse of a factor 
score including (1) board size, (2) the proportion of busy outside directors, 
and (3) the proportion of busy inside directors, higher values implying 
more intense monitoring; 
CEO_POWER = CEO influence over the board of directors measured as a factor score of 
(1) the proportion of outside directors appointed by the CEO, (2) the 
proportion of inside directors appointed by the CEO, and (3) CEO duality; 
FIRM_SIZE = Natural logarithm of total firm sales (mio. US $). 
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 The results of the annual probit regressions and random sample probit 
regressions are presented in Column four and five, respectively. The results are similar 
to the pooled sample results with two notable exceptions. First, in the random sample 
probit regressions, the interaction UNPREDICTABILITY×MONIT_INTENS is 
positive, but not significant. Second, in the random sample probit regressions, firm 
size has a significant positive effect on the probability of using implicit weights, which 
indicates that the overall monitoring environment is associated with implicit multi-
measure contracts. 
Table 2.5 
Probit estimations of the choice of implicit weights in multi-measure contracts 
 Predicted Pooled Sample Annual Samples Random Samples 
UNPREDICTABILITY + 0.997% (0.024) 
1.197*** 
(0.000) 
1.203*** 
(0.001) 
MONIT_INTENS ? 0.058 (0.525) 
0.047 
(0.568) 
0.056 
(0.608) 
UNPREDICTABILITY 
×MONIT_INTENS + 
0.321* 
(0.097) 
0.476*** 
(0.001) 
0.323 
(0.116) 
EQUITY_INC - 0.153** (0.011) 
0.162*** 
(0.000) 
0.172*** 
(0.001) 
CEO_POWER ? -0.026 (0.777) 
-0.023 
(0.000) 
-0.058 
(0.480) 
FIRM_SIZE ? 0.033 (0.705) 
0.012 
(0.830) 
0.098* 
(0.092) 
Industry dummies  YES YES YES 
Year dummies  YES - YES 
Firm-clustering  YES - - 
Pseudo R2  12.4% 15.3% 15.2% 
Sample size  941 172-204 217-239 
***, ** is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively (one-tailed for predictions, two-
tailed otherwise). P-values reported in parentheses. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
UNPREDICATBILITY = Extent of environmental unpredictability. Time series variability of 
monthly stock returns 60 months prior to the proxy data; 
MONIT_INTENS = Monitoring intensity of the board, calculated as the inverse of a factor 
score including (1) board size, (2) the proportion of busy outside 
directors, and (3) the proportion of busy inside directors, higher values 
implying more intense monitoring; 
EQUITY_INC = The sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio to a 1% change in stock 
price; 
CEO_POWER = CEO influence over the board of directors measured as a factor score 
of (1) the proportion of outside directors appointed by the CEO, (2) the 
proportion of inside directors appointed by the CEO, and (3) CEO 
duality; 
FIRM_SIZE = Natural logarithm of total firm sales (mio. US $). 
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 Overall, I find strong evidence that the value of implicit weights applied in multi-
measure contracts increases with environmental unpredictability, but only moderate 
evidence that this effect is dependent on the monitoring intensity of the board. The 
results thus provide strong support for hypothesis 2 and moderate support for 
hypothesis 3b. 
 In sum, I provide evidence consistent with the argument that, in earnings-based 
contracts, discretion is used to reduce the risk imposed on the agent and that this use is 
conditional on the monitoring intensity of the board. I further provide evidence 
consistent with the argument that, in multi-measure contracts, discretion is used to 
improve congruity in objectives between the principal and agent when it is difficult to 
ex-ante establish the optimal course of action. As a result, discretion improves 
incentive contracting through risk reduction and congruity improvement. 
2.4.2 Additional analysis 
I argue that discretionary bonus adjustments in earnings-based contracts are used for 
risk reduction purposes and my empirical results are consistent with this argument. To 
provide further support for my argument, I examine the level of short-term incentive 
compensation based on earnings. In general, more (less) incentives can be provided 
when there is less (more) exposure to risk. Thus, if discretionary bonus adjustments 
are used to reduce risk, then, ceteris paribus, the level of short-term incentive 
compensation should be higher when discretion is part of the contract versus when it is 
not. 
 To test this prediction, I focus on the target bonus as a percentage of salary as the 
measure of short-term incentive compensation. I gather target bonus data from the 
proxy statements for the EARNINGS subsample, which results in a usable sample of 
230 observations; 151 that exclude and 79 that include the use of discretionary bonus 
adjustments. 
 A comparison of the raw means of the target bonus between the use and non-use 
of discretion shows that the target bonus equals 84.53% when discretion is used versus 
78.68% when it is not, and the difference is statistically significant (p=0.07; 
one-tailed). This difference becomes larger and more significant when I examine the 
least squares means and control for the level of noise and industry. More specifically, 
the least squares means of the target bonus equals 86.31% when discretion is used 
versus 77.74% when it is not. The difference is more than a month’s salary and is 
statistically significant (p=0.02; one-tailed).15 In sum, these results provide further 
support for my argument that discretionary bonus adjustments are used to reduce risk. 
                                                 
15 This finding is robust to the inclusion of additional controls, such as firm size, equity incentives, 
environmental unpredictability, monitoring intensity, and CEO power. 
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 In the main analysis, I examine the choice of discretion within either a sample 
with earnings-based contracts or a sample with contracts that include diverse 
measures. Although this structure is consistent with my theory, I additionally examine 
the choice among all four possible contracts using a multinomial logit analysis.16 
Following previous research (see e.g. Bushman et al. 1996; Ittner et al. 1997), I 
include, over and above the variables used in estimating equations (1) and (2), a 
number of variables that influence the choice of earnings versus multiple measures 
(informativeness proxies). First, the strategy of a firm is an important determinant of 
how complete accounting earnings are in assessing managerial performance (Ittner et 
al. 1997). Following the defender-prospector categorization proposed by Miles and 
Snow (1978), I expect earnings to be more informative for firms operating at the 
defender end of the continuum. I compute the construct STRATEGY as a three-item 
factor score of a firm’s market-to-book, employees-to-sales, and R&D-to-sales ratios. I 
use averages of these ratios five years prior to the proxy data; lower values are 
associated with firms near the defender end of the continuum (cf. Ittner et al. 1997). 
 Second, the lengths of firm product development and product life cycles 
determine how well accounting earnings assess immediate effects of managerial long-
term oriented actions. Using the National Academy of Engineering classification 
(1992), I use two indicator variables that take on the value of one if a firm is 
characterized as having long product development cycle (D_CYCLE) and a long 
product life cycle (L_CYCLE). 
 Finally, I also include the firm’s financial stability using Altman Z-Scores 
(Altman 1968) averaged five years prior to the proxy data (ALTMAN). Financially 
distressed firms need to emphasize financial measures to direct managerial focus to the 
improvement of short-term profits to ensure firm survival (Ittner et al. 1997). 
 The results of the multinomial response model provide the same inferences for 
the choice of discretion in the EARNINGS subsample and DIVERSE subsample as 
those based on the results in Table 2.4 and 2.5; I therefore do not report these results. 
Noteworthy, however, is that none of the informativeness proxies (STRATEGY, 
D_CYCLE, L_CYCLE, and ALTMAN) have an effect on the use of discretion within 
the two subsamples. This implies that the use of discretion, as examined in this study, 
is not driven by informativeness. 
 The results for the remaining four choices among contracts are presented in 
Table 2.6. I find that the choice of each of the multi-measure contracts versus each of 
the earnings-based contracts is primarily driven by monitoring intensity and the 
informativeness proxies. Increased monitoring intensity increases the preference for 
earnings-based  contracts  over  multi-measure contracts, while  the  latter contracts are  
                                                 
16 I use multinomial logit instead of multinomial probit because the latter, although theoretically attractive, has 
severe practical problems with the estimation (Wooldridge 2002). 
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Table 2.6 
Multinomial Logit Analysis of Alternative Contracts 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Diverse with 
Explicit weights 
vs. 
Earnings only 
 
Diverse with 
Implicit weights 
vs. 
Earnings only 
Diverse with 
Explicit weights 
vs. 
Earnings with 
Discretionary 
Bonus 
Diverse with 
Implicit weights 
vs. 
Earnings with 
Discretionary 
Bonus 
NOISE 0.055 
(0.824) 
0.209 
(0.285) 
−0.328 
(0.261) 
−0.174 
(0.490) 
UNPREDICTABILITY −0.794 
(0.488) 
0.714 
(0.191) 
−1.02 
(0.392) 
0.491 
(0.463) 
MONIT_INTENS −0.328* 
(0.086) 
−0.212 
(0.109) 
−0.401* 
(0.066) 
−0.285 
(0.107) 
NOISE  
× MONIT_INTENS 
0.009 
(0.958) 
−0.062 
(0.645) 
−0.425* 
(0.077) 
−0.496** 
(0.019) 
UNPREDICTABILITY 
× MONIT_INTENS 
−0.391 
(0.510) 
0.135 
(0.630) 
−0.428 
(0.469) 
0.097 
(0.759) 
EQUITY_INC −0.262* 
(0.059) 
−0.072 
(0.455) 
−0.133 
(0.394) 
0.057 
(0.618) 
CEO_POWER 0.010 
(0.954) 
−0.032 
(0.790) 
−0.081 
(0.681) 
−0.123 
(0.428) 
FIRM_SIZE 0.083 
(0.673) 
0.192 
(0.109) 
0.073 
(0.766) 
0.183 
(0.337) 
STRATEGY 0.341 
(0.118) 
0.406**
(0.026) 
0.123 
(0.611) 
0.188 
(0.387) 
D_CYCLE 0.877 
(0.106) 
0.265 
(0.476) 
1.440** 
(0.023) 
0.828 
(0.108) 
L_CYCLE 0.098 
(0.843) 
0.190 
(0.597) 
0.151 
(0.802) 
0.243 
(0.607) 
ALTMAN 0.038 
(0.280) 
0.036 
(0.155) 
0.031 
(0.425) 
0.029 
(0.316) 
Pseudo R2: 8.64%     
Sample size: 1,753     
***, **, * is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed based on 
firm-clustered standard errors; P-value in parenthesis). 
The analysis includes industry dummies and year dummies. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
UNPREDICATBILITY = Extent of environmental unpredictability. Time series variability of 
monthly stock returns 60 months prior to the proxy data; 
 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 2.6 (continued) 
NOISE = Time series variability in median industry accounting returns 
measured five years prior to the proxy data. The factor score is 
calculated using variability of (1) return on assets, (2) return on sales, 
and (3) return on equity; 
MONIT_INTENS = Monitoring intensity of the board, calculated as the inverse of a factor 
score including (1) board size, (2) the proportion of busy outside 
directors, and (3) the proportion of busy inside directors, higher values 
implying more intense monitoring; 
EQUITY_INC = The sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio to a 1% change in stock 
price; 
CEO_POWER = CEO influence over the board of directors measured as a factor score 
of (1) the proportion of outside directors appointed by the CEO, (2) 
the proportion of inside directors appointed by the CEO, and (3) CEO 
duality; 
STRATEGY = The firm’s prospective strategy measured as a factor score of the ratios 
(1) research and development to sales (2) market-to-book value, and 
(3) the employees to sales; 
L_CYCLE = A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm is classified 
as having long term product life cycles, and 0 otherwise; 
D_CYCLE = A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm is classified 
as having long term product development cycles, and 0 otherwise; 
ALTMAN = A variable accounting for the firm’s degree of financial stability. 
Calculated using Altman’s (1968) financial stability model, values 
below 1.8 implying a high likelihood of firm bankruptcy; 
FIRM_SIZE = Natural logarithm of total firm sales (mio. US $). 
preferred over the former the lower the informativeness of accounting performance 
(e.g. Bushman et al. 1996; Ittner et al. 1997).  
 Further, the effect of monitoring intensity on the preference for earnings-based 
contracts with discretionary bonus adjustments over the two multi-measure contracts is 
greater the greater the noise in earnings. This is consistent with higher monitoring 
intensity allowing the risk reduction benefits of discretion in earnings-based contracts 
to be exploited to a greater extent. Finally, greater use of equity incentives increases 
the preference for explicit earnings-based contracts over explicit multi-measure 
contracts, which suggests that equity incentives and the use of diverse measures act as 
substitutes. 
2.4.3 Robustness checks 
To test the robustness of my results, I perform the following tests. First, in the previous 
analyses, I examined the choice of discretion within two different subsamples without 
controlling for potential sample selection effects. To correct for the possibility that a 
firm’s choice of a specific type of discretion is also related to the likelihood of the firm 
choosing diverse performance measures, I use a Heckman (1979) procedure. More 
specifically, I apply partial maximum likelihood to fit a probit model with sample 
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selection to examine both the use of discretionary bonus adjustments and implicit 
weights (Wooldridge 2002). To usefully apply the procedure, I include several factors 
that influence the use of diverse measures in incentive contracts, but are not expected 
to influence the use of discretion, i.e., I include STRATEGY, D_CYCLE, L_CYCLE, 
and ALTMANN in the selection model. 
 Consistent with my previous multinomial response model, the results of the 
selection models (not tabulated) show that the incidence of multi-measure contracts is 
positively associated with a prospector strategy (STRATEGY) and financial stability 
(ALTMAN), and negatively associated with monitoring intensity (MONIT_INTENS). 
Further, the results of the main analysis presented in Table 2.4 and 2.5 remain 
unchanged after controlling for sample selection in the probit model. Finally, based on 
the Wald test, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence between the 
selection model and the probit model. Overall, these results corroborate my previous 
inferences. 
 Second, I test whether my argument that specific factors lead to a preference for 
a specific type of discretion holds. More specifically, I argue that noise, not 
unpredictability, leads to discretion in earnings-based contracts to reduce risk, while 
unpredictability, not noise, leads to discretion in multi-measure contracts to reduce 
noncongruity. To test this, I examine whether my results for equation (2.1) in Table 
2.4 (equation (2.2) in Table 2.5) are sensitive to the inclusion of 
UNPREDICTABILITY and UNPREDICTABILITY×MONIT_INTENS (NOISE and 
NOISE×MONIT_INTENS). The results from these regressions (not tabulated) lead to 
the same inferences as those discussed above. More importantly, 
UNPREDICTABILITY and UNPREDICTABILITY×MONIT_INTENS (NOISE and 
NOISE×MONIT_INTENS) have no significant effects in equation (2.1) ((2.2)). These 
insignificant effects remain when I replace NOISE by UNPREDICTABILITY in 
equation (2.1) and replace UNPREDICTABILITY by NOISE in equation (2.2). 
 Third, to further analyze the unexpected result that the use of equity incentives 
increases the use of implicit weights in multi-measure contracts, I examine whether 
this result is driven by lower board monitoring intensity and/or more powerful CEOs. I 
include the interaction terms EQUITY_INC×MONIT_INTENS and 
EQUITY_INC×CEO_POWER in the probit estimation of the use of implicit weights. 
The results (not tabulated) show that the interaction EQUITY_INC×MONIT_INTENS 
is negative and marginally significant (p=0.169 two-tailed), while the interaction 
EQUITY_INC×CEO_POWER is not significant. All other inferences are similar to 
those presented in Table 2.5. These findings indicate that the positive association 
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between equity incentives and implicit weights is at least partly driven by boards with 
lower monitoring intensity.17 
 Finally, to examine whether the million-dollar-tax-rule, which follows from 
Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m), affects the use of discretion and its disclosure 
within the proxy statement, I include a dummy variable that equals 1 if lagged salary 
plus bonus exceeds $1 million and zero otherwise.18 The inclusion of this dummy 
variable in examining both the use of discretion in earnings-based contracts and the 
use of implicit weights in multi-measure contracts shows no significant effects. All 
other inferences are identical to those shown in Table 2.4 and 2.5. 
2.5 Summary and conclusion 
In CEO incentive contracts, discretion by the board of directors is often present in one 
form or another. In this study, I examine whether this behavior can be explained by 
optimal contracting considerations. Two important considerations in incentive 
contracting are the risk premium paid to a risk averse agent and the level of 
congruence achieved and I argue that discretion can play a role in addressing these 
considerations. First, discretion can be used to reduce the risk imposed on an agent by 
subjectively adjusting for uncontrollable factors. This role is especially important in a 
single-measure contract and increases in importance the higher the noise. Second, 
discretion can lead to a congruity improvement, a role which is especially important in 
multi-measure contracts. Discretion can lead to a congruity improvement by 
subjectively weighting the multiple performance measure ex-post, the benefits of 
which are higher the more unpredictable the environment. 
 In the empirical analysis, I focus on bonus contracts solely based on accounting 
earnings and bonus contracts based on both accounting and non-accounting 
information. My empirical results are in line with expectations and show that the use 
of discretion is positively related to (1) the noise in accounting earnings, once 
accounting measures are the sole performance measures used and (2) the extent of 
environmental unpredictability, once the firm combines accounting and nonaccounting 
measures. I further find that the monitoring intensity of the board of directors 
                                                 
17 The marginal effect of the cross-partial of EQUITY_INC×MONIT_INTENS is negative for 98% of the 
observations, 56% of which is statistically significant. None of the observation-specific marginal effects of the 
cross-partial of EQUITY_INC×CEO_POWER are significant. 
18 Under Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, corporations may not deduct annual compensation in 
excess of $1 million paid to certain employees, generally its Chief Executive Officer and its four other most 
highly compensated executive officers, unless that compensation qualifies as performance-based compensation. 
As board discretion and its effect on executive compensation are generally deemed non-performance based, 
boards providing target bonuses above $1million may be reluctant to use discretion in order to ensure tax 
deductibility of compensation expenses. 
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positively affects the impact of noise and environmental unpredictability on implicit 
contracts. 
 Overall, I find that the use of discretion in annual bonus contracts by boards of 
directors is consistent with optimal contracting. Boards use discretion in an attempt to 
resolve the contracting problems associated with compensation risk and goal 
congruence and are more likely to do so when there is more intense monitoring. This 
evidence provides an important counterbalance to the view that executive 
compensation is driven by rent extraction motives. 
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Chapter 3  
Bonus Contracts, Private Information and CEO Turnover19 
Abstract 
I address the question whether performance measures that are specified in annual 
bonus contracts represent overall performance dimensions used by boards of directors 
in making governance decisions. Recent studies claim that managerial incentives are 
predominantly provided by equity holdings rather than short-term cash compensation. 
Given the dominance of equity compensation and the fact that firms invest resources 
in the design and use of bonus contracts, it is unclear why the vast majority of firms 
continue to use annual bonus contracts if these would create only minor, or no 
incentive benefits. I argue that boards of directors use bonus contracts as a channel to 
ex-ante communicate how performance will be evaluated annually and thus signal the 
measures relevant for CEO termination decisions, which provides significant 
incentives. Further, the resulting cash compensation communicates the board’s actual 
performance evaluation of the CEO, which can disclose private information to the 
capital market. My empirical results are consistent with these arguments and show that 
the incentive weight on privately observed performance measures in bonus contracts is 
systematically related to the importance of these measures for CEO turnover. I further 
show that the stock market reaction to a management change depends on bonus 
contract design. I specifically find a positive reaction when boards of directors have 
signaled to solely use public information in CEO performance evaluation (good news 
about the board) and a negative reaction when they (also) use private information (bad 
news about the CEO). Overall, I show that the care taken in designing annual bonus 
contracts can be explained by its link with governance decisions and indicate that 
performance measurement issues are an important part of the corporate governance 
process. 
                                                 
19 This chapter is based on a working paper co-authored with Frank Moers. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In this study, I examine whether performance measures that are specified in annual 
bonus contracts represent performance dimensions used by boards of directors in 
making governance decisions. Recent studies claim that managerial incentives are 
predominantly provided by managerial equity holdings rather than short-term cash 
compensation because the latter is relatively small in monetary terms (Hall and 
Liebman 1998; Murphy 1999; Core et al. 2003). Annual bonus contracts used by 
organizations, however, exhibit substantial heterogeneity in their design and, with few 
exceptions, exclude stock price measures. Given that firms invest resources in the 
design of bonus contracts, it is unclear why the vast majority of firms continue to use 
annual bonus contracts if these would create only minor, or no incentive benefits (see 
also Bushman and Smith 2001). Assuming that boards optimally design incentive 
contracts, I seek evidence for the existence of a link between annual bonus contracts 
and CEO incentives beyond the direct, supposedly trivial, monetary component.  
 One of the primary functions of boards of directors is to hire and fire the CEO. 
The threat of employment termination provides significant CEO incentives, especially 
during the last decade (Kaplan and Minton 2006). Given this, the board’s annual 
performance evaluation of the CEO is of crucial importance to providing incentives 
(The Business Roundtable 1990; Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Bushman and Smith 2001). 
I argue that boards of directors use bonus contracts as a channel to ex-ante 
communicate how performance will be evaluated annually, while the resulting cash 
compensation communicates the actual performance evaluation by the board. Using 
bonus contracts for this purpose is beneficial because they (1) provide a credible 
process of periodic performance evaluation, (2) provide formal performance feedback 
to CEOs, (3) provide formal discharge of the boards’ monitoring responsibilities, and 
(4) disclose boards’ private information to the capital market in way that is not 
pertinent to decisions by competitors. I examine whether CEO turnover is associated 
with performance measures defined in annual bonus contracts and thereby test the 
expectation that one reason for boards to write formal annual bonus contracts is to 
communicate valued performance categories that are used in compensation and 
continuation decisions. 
 In addition, I examine to what extent the stock market reaction to the 
announcement of CEO turnover is conditional on bonus contract design. If investors 
believe that a CEO turnover is significant, i.e. they interpret the event as an incentive 
mechanism following poor performance, a stock price reaction should become evident 
around announcement. However, as prior literature indicates, even if the change is due 
to poor performance and in the shareholders’ interest, this reaction can differ 
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depending on the type of information that is carried to outsiders along with the CEO 
change. Following Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), I expect a positive reaction when 
boards of directors have signaled to solely use public information in CEO performance 
evaluation (good news about the board) and a negative reaction when they (also) use 
private information (bad news about the CEO). 
 To test my predictions, I employ an extensive dataset of firms that disclose the 
relative weights placed on accounting (public) and private performance measures in 
the proxy statement. I model the CEO replacement decision for 348 (303 non-turnover, 
45 turnover) public firms in the year 2002. I estimate CEO turnover as a function of 
past market and accounting performance, CEO demographics, and the extent to which 
boards of directors rely on accounting earnings only or add other, private measures. 
Subsequently, I use a standard event study approach (Brown and Warner 1985) to 
measure abnormal returns around the announcement of CEO dismissal and explain the 
cross-sectional variation in returns using bonus contract characteristics. 
 In line with expectations, I find that, after controlling for market and accounting 
performance, the performance assessment of the board, as approximated by cash 
compensation (cf. Hayes and Schaefer 2000), is more negatively associated with CEO 
turnover the more weight is placed on measures capturing private performance 
dimensions. Further, the event study results are consistent with expectations and show 
that the market reacts positively to a CEO change made by boards that signal to use 
public information and negatively to a change made by boards that signal to (also) use 
private information. I interpret these findings as evidence of my expectation that 
annual bonus contracts have incentive spillovers through their implicit link with CEO 
continuation decisions and that private information plays a role in CEO replacement. 
 I contribute to the literature in several related ways. First, by showing a 
systematic link between observed bonus contract characteristics and CEO turnover, I 
point to the role of these contracts for corporate boards in making governance 
decisions. By investigating the role of annual bonus contracts in CEO replacement, I 
also provide evidence for how these measures are used to create significant managerial 
incentives. Previous studies show that although equity compensation dominates cash 
compensation, boards play an important role in guiding executive actions, by 
measuring and evaluating performance information that is not available to outsiders. 
The present work adds to this literature by pointing to the threat of dismissal as an 
incentive to enforce valuable managerial actions. In this context, I also provide the 
first evidence I am aware of, about the role of performance that is not measured by 
publicly available measures in CEO replacement decisions. While prior studies point 
to the relevance of accounting and market performance in CEO turnover, the present 
results suggest that the incidence of CEO turnover is also a function of performance on 
private dimensions and whether and how these dimensions are contracted upon. 
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Finally, I show that stock market reactions to CEO turnover differ depending on the 
type of information used in governance decisions, which is consistent with a yet 
untested prediction by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and provides a plausible 
explanation for the mixed evidence in previous event studies in this area. 
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, I discuss the 
theory and develop the hypotheses. In section 3, I describe the sample selection, 
method, and variable measurement and in section 4 I discuss the empirical results. 
Finally, in section 5 I provide a conclusion. 
3.2 Theory and hypothesis development 
3.2.1 The role of annual bonus contracts in CEO turnover decisions 
The dominant role of equity compensation in CEO compensation has led researchers 
to question the incentive relevance of cash compensation in general, and bonus 
contracts in particular (e.g. Core et al. 2003). If firms administer short-term 
compensation contracts for the purpose of providing incentives, there must be an 
alternative mechanism by which these incentives are created other than the direct but 
small effect they have on CEO compensation. I argue that the accounting literature 
attempting to predict management changes allows valuable insights into this issue. 
 Boards of directors can determine optimal equity holdings and delegate equity 
compensation to the capital market via price setting, but boards cannot delegate 
employment decisions (Bushman and Smith 2001). In order to make such decisions 
they need to interpret signals about the effects of CEO actions. Agency theory predicts 
that any (costless) performance measure that is informative about the agent’s effort 
should be used for incentive purposes (Holmstrom 1979). While firms that perform 
poorly on the stock market are more likely to change CEOs, the effects of accounting 
performance are consistently more predictive of management turnover (e.g. Engel et 
al. 2003). One explanation for this is that stock prices include market expectations and 
therefore provide a noisier signal than accounting performance or private information 
held by the board. Further, markets are not always sufficiently informed about 
companies’ plans, reducing their ability to predict future firm prospects. One reason 
for this is firms deliberately treating information about their strategic configuration 
(e.g. R&D spending, new product development, customer satisfaction) confidentially 
because the immediate positive effect of such information on financial markets is 
potentially outweighed by the negative consequences of sharing it with competitors, 
for instance at early investment stages. Consequently, a company’s stock performance 
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is unlikely to provide boards with CEO related information that is not also more 
accurately measured internally. 
 The importance of non-price performance measures is not only prevalent in 
executive turnover decisions but also in observed bonus contracting practices. 
Numerous studies investigating the design of annual bonus contracts report that 
executive short-term bonuses are determined almost exclusively based on accounting 
performance measures and measures that are privately observed (e.g. Bushman et al. 
1996; Ittner et al. 1997). Expecting an association between short-term bonus contracts 
and CEO turnover is appealing for at least two reasons. First, in contrast to the direct 
monetary impact, CEO turnover represents a strong incentive mechanism, as turnover 
results in a loss of guaranteed future income, decreased reputation in the labor market, 
and a corrosion of the value of equity held. 
 Second, annual bonus contracts allow boards to communicate job aspects it 
deems important and provide them with timely measures for performance evaluation. 
Regarding the evaluation taking place in the bonus determination procedure, boards 
will detect deviations of actual performance from planned targets informing them 
about courses of actions taken by the CEO. It therefore seems logical that boards, in 
making the decision over continued CEO employment, will benchmark the results of 
CEO actions against the same indicators it commits to in determining compensation. 
 As mentioned earlier, previous research shows that the probability of CEO 
turnover is inversely related to market and especially accounting performance. Given 
that these performance measures are generally considered important and are also 
publicly observable, it is of particular importance for boards to use bonus contracts to 
signal the extent to which they use private information in making governance 
decisions. As a result, I predict that the higher the incentive weight placed on measures 
of private performance, the more these measures are being used in governance 
decisions and thus the stronger the inverse relationship between privately observed 
performance and the probability of CEO turnover. Hence, I formulate the following 
hypothesis. 
 
H1: The explicit weight on private information in bonus contracts is 
positively related to the impact of private information on CEO turnover 
decisions. 
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3.2.2 Stock market reactions to CEO turnover based on public vs. private signals 
As noted by Furtado and Rozeff (1987), Jensen and Warner (1988), Warner, Watts and 
Wruck (1988), and Bonnier and Bruner (1989), the abnormal return at the 
announcement of a management change is the aggregate of an information component 
and a real component. The information component can be negative in case the turnover 
event implies unanticipated negative information. The real effect is positive if 
outsiders perceive the change to be in shareholders’ interest. A positive net effect can 
thus be expected in case the real component is larger than the information component, 
while worse than expected information can outweigh the benefits of the management 
change and result in a negative net effect. Following this reasoning, Bonnier and 
Bruner (1989) find empirical evidence for financially distressed firms (i.e. the real 
component should be higher than the information component) experiencing positive 
abnormal returns around the announcement of management changes. Mahajan and 
Lummer (1993) argue that smooth management changes are perceived as less negative 
by outsiders than changes implying unsatisfactory CEO performance. They find that 
CEO changes taking place before common CEO retirement age, and when the leaving 
CEO does not assume an alternative position afterwards are associated with negative 
abnormal returns surrounding announcement of top-management changes. 
 More directly related to my setting is the paper by Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998). They show analytically that boards basing the decision to fire the CEO on 
private information reveal to outsiders that their previous expectations about CEO 
quality were above actual performance. They predict that the stock price decreases as 
investor expectations about the incumbent CEO are lower than they were previously 
about the leaving CEO. In contrast, a firing based on public signals conveys no new 
information about the CEO but signals good news about board independence, which 
results in an increase in stock price. 
 In sum, if investors process the type of information used (in expectation) in CEO 
turnover, I expect the following reactions to the announcement of the event. First, 
CEO turnover by a board that signals only to use publicly observable measures is 
evaluated positively by investors and results in positive stock price reaction. Second, 
CEO turnover that is based on private information conveys a negative signal as the 
CEO change signals that actual performance is worse than anticipated based on 
publicly observable performance. Moreover, this negative effect is expected to be 
stronger the greater the importance of private information in making governance 
decisions. As a result, I state the following hypotheses. 
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H2a: Abnormal returns to shareholders around announcements of CEO 
turnovers are positive if the turnover is (in expectation) conditioned on 
public performance measures only. 
H2b: Abnormal returns to shareholders around announcements of CEO 
turnovers are negative if the turnover is (in expectation) conditioned on a 
combination of public and private performance  measures. 
H3: Abnormal returns to shareholders are more negative around CEO 
turnover announcements, the greater the ex-ante incentive weight on 
private performance measures. 
3.3 Sample, data, and method 
3.3.1 Probability of CEO turnover 
3.3.1.1 Sample and data 
My analysis is based on CEO incentive contracts described in the compensation 
section of SEC Proxy Statements (DEF 14a) as described in the previous chapters of 
this dissertation. Proxy statements do not only provide information about specified 
performance measures but also whether and how the measures are weighted ex-ante. 
Following the approach of previous studies, I identify a company with turnover 
whenever the same individual is not identified in EXECUCOMP as CEO in fiscal year 
2002. This results in 139 publicly listed firms with CEO turnover taking place between 
fiscal years 2001 and 2002.20 As I require the turnover to happen after the formal 
annual performance evaluation, as represented by the release date of the proxy 
statement of fiscal year 2001, 53 firms drop out because the CEO left office before the 
2001 proxy statement was released. In the remaining 86 firms, the turnover 
announcement was made after the CEO served the full fiscal year 2001 and proxy 
information refers to that year. I further search each firm’s annual reports for causes of 
changing CEOs that are unrelated to firm performance (position “inherited” from 
family member, health problems, death of current CEO) and exclude those firms (14 
                                                 
20 I focus on CEO changes in this period because it represents the maximum data availability per year in the 
panel data described in chapter 2 across the 1998 – 2002 period. I restrict the focus of this study to one CEO 
turnover year due to the cumbersome and time consuming endeavor of reading and coding additional proxy 
statement information of the identified turnover firms.  
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obs.), as well as firms not administering a formal annual bonus program (6 obs.), 
which reduces the sample to 66 observations. 
 As I require turnover firms to fix the performance measures it will commit to in 
the performance evaluation process, I identify the ex-ante specification of annual 
bonus contracts as indicated in the Proxy statement. This includes the bonus terms for 
the fiscal year in which the turnover decision is made. The information is taken from 
the Compensation Committee’s report on executive compensation of each sample 
firm. I first focus on performance measures the board indicates to be used in awarding 
bonuses. I distinguish between non-price performance measures that are (i) publicly 
observable and (ii) private performance measures that originate from the firm’s 
internal information environment.21 Table 2.1 of the preceding chapter provides 
excerpts from a proxy statement for each of the two groups (panel A and B, 
respectively). 
 Subsequently, I search for the weights that are explicitly attached to the 
respective performance dimensions in deriving bonus payouts.22 Of the remaining 66 
firms, 18 firms (27%) use a flexible approach (implicit weights) in deriving bonuses, 
in which incentive weights are determined ex-post. I delete these observations, 
resulting in a total turnover sample comprised of 48 firms that administer an annual 
bonus program including an ex-ante definition of relative weights attached to 
performance measures in use. 
 As the control group, I use publicly listed firms without CEO replacement from 
1998 onwards including the period of interest (2001-2002). The data is taken from the 
data set described in the previous chapter and encompasses 2,575 firm year 
observations in the 1998-2002 period. As mentioned earlier, the data includes the 
relevant annual bonus contract information described above. Of the 519 firms from 
that sample in the fiscal year of interest, 216 firms (41%) use a flexible approach in 
deriving bonuses.23 I exclude these firms, which results in a total of 303 non-turnover 
observations. Hence, the total sample is comprised if 351 firms with explicit ex-ante 
contract specifications in 2001-2002. The unreported distribution of sample firms as 
classified by two-digit SIC code shows no noteworthy abnormalities in distribution 
among turnover and non turnover firms. I use COMPUSTAT to obtain returns and 
accounting data, and EXECUCOMP to obtain compensation data.  
                                                 
21 Examples of public non-price performance measures are “Earnings per Share”, “ROE”, and “Profits”. 
Examples of performance measures that are related to the “private” performance dimension are “boards’ 
subjective evaluations”, “Quality”, “Leadership”, and “Innovativeness”.  
22 Next to the naming of actual percentages attached to specific performance measures, I also search for semantic 
structures that allow an indirect deduction of weightings used. Examples include “[…] these measures were 
weighted equally” or “Bonus payments are based exclusively on the achievement of pre-specified Earnings per 
share targets”.  
23 As already mentioned in chapter 2 of this dissertation, the reading and coding of Proxy statements was 
undergone with two other researchers to ensure the validity of extracted information. 
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3.3.1.2 Method 
The empirical model is a probit regression in which the dependent variable equals 1 
when a CEO turnover occurs and 0 otherwise. The hypothesis is that contract 
specifications with regard to the explicit weights attached to public and non-public 
dimensions of CEO performance explain the impact of different measures of firm 
performance on the likelihood of CEO turnover. In particular, I expect the impact of 
privately observed performance on turnover probabilities to be higher the more 
important private information is in the performance evaluation process, as indicated on 
an ex-ante basis. Thus, if a systematic link between performance, contract 
specifications and CEO turnover exists, I expect a significant interaction effect 
between private performance and the respective incentive weight (EW_PRIVATEt) on 
turnover. 
 An empirical problem is that, while public performance is per definition 
observable, private performance cannot be measured directly. I circumvent this 
problem by approximating private performance with variation in current cash 
compensation that is unexplained by variations in current public performance. This is 
in line with Hayes and Schaefer (2000) who show that, controlling for public 
performance, the unexplained variation in CEO cash compensation is informative 
about future operating performance. I measure ΔCASHCOMPt as the change in the 
logarithm of CEO cash compensation from fiscal year t-1 (2000) to the turnover fiscal 
year t (2001) and calculate the interaction term ΔCASHCOMPt×EW_PRIVATEt. 
 As the measure of public non-price performance, I calculate the change in Return 
on Assets (ΔROAt) and as the measure public price performance, I use the change in 
stock market returns (ΔRETt). Further, I include one lagged change of the publicly 
observable performance measures, which reduces the sample by three CEO turnover 
observations (n=45). In addition, I include CEO age (CEOAGEt) and a dummy 
variable taking on the value one if the CEO is older than 64 years (OLDER64t). The 
above mentioned controls are in line with previous studies predicting management 
changes (e.g. Coughlan and Schmidt 1985; Engel et al. 2003). While turnover 
probabilities are shown to be negatively related with public performance and age, a 
usual practice of firms is to have mandatory retirement policies at the age of 64 
thereby increasing the likelihood of observing CEO turnover. Based on the above, I 
test the following probit regression to model the CEO turnover likelihood. 
 
itititit
itititit
itititit
ROARETOLDER
CEOAGECASHCOMPPRIVATEEWPRIVATEEW
CASHCOMPROARETTURNOVERP
εβββ
βββ
ββββ
+Δ+Δ+
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−−
+
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32101
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__
)(
 (3.8) 
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 I expect the sign of the coefficient of the interaction term, public performance, 
and age to be negative, and the age dummy to be positive. I formulate no directional 
expectations concerning β3 and β4. 
3.3.1.3 Descriptive Statistics     
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the cross-sectional sample in the main 
turnover analysis, including summary statistics for the total sample, for the firms 
experiencing CEO turnover, and for the firms without a changing CEO in the period of 
interest. To control for potential effects of outliers, all continuous variables are 
winsorized at their 1st, 99th percentiles. The mean difference of stock and accounting 
performance is lower for the turnover sample as well as compensation changes. 
Further, the turnover sample has a higher average CEO age and also a higher 
proportion of CEOs older than 64. The proportion of turnover firms (15%) is slightly 
higher than proportions reported in previous turnover studies, which is consistent with 
Kaplan and Minton (2006) who observe an increase of CEO replacements from 1998 
onwards. 
3.3.2 Market reactions to CEO turnover announcements 
3.3.2.1 Sample  
To investigate investor’s reactions on turnover announcements, I focus on the 66 CEO 
turnovers for which EXECUCOMP indicates that the respective executive’s last fiscal 
year in office was 2001. I define the event day as the first occurrence of the turnover in 
business press and/or the respective firm’s news releases, which are searched for using 
Lexis/Nexis. Moreover, I identify confounding news (release of 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K; 
annual shareholder’s meeting) five days before and after the event, as I require 
potential stock market reactions not to occur due to other events, such as earnings 
announcements. In total, 17 of the 66 CEO turnovers are announced in combination 
with other material information, leaving a “clean” sample of 49 events. 
3.3.2.2 Univariate analysis 
To test whether outsiders infer signals regarding the CEOs annual compensation at 
announcement, I employ a standard event study methodology proposed by Brown and 
Warner (1985). I test whether cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) significantly differ 
from zero around announcement of CEO turnover, where I partition the sample 
according to whether turnovers are expected to be based on public performance 
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measures only (PUBLIC) or also on private performance (PRIVATE). Given my 
prediction regarding the direction of investor reactions, I expect CAR to be positive 
and significantly different from zero if turnover is conditioned on public information 
only, and negative and significantly different from zero if boards condition the 
turnover decision on private information as well. The abnormal stock returns for firm i 
on day t in the event period is the difference between firm i’s stock return and the 
return of the size decile portfolio obtained from CRSP: 
 ARit =Rit –E(Rit) (3.3) 
 
Table 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Turnover Sampe (n=45)  
Control Sample 
(n=303)  
Total Sample 
(n=348) 
 Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD 
ΔROAt -.116 -0.03 .377  -.019 0 .061  -.03 0.01 .153 
ΔRETt -.25 -0.22 1.08  -.045 0.05 .9  -.078 0.02 1.03 
ΔROA-1 -.002 0 .119  .001 0 .066  .001 0 .075 
ΔRETt-1 -.156 -.08 1.6  .033 0.04 .971  .009 0.03 1.072 
ΔCASHCOMPt -.095 -0.08 .495  -.056 0.02 .456  -.061 0.01 .461 
EW_PRIVATEt .131 0 .2  .07 0 .189  .074 0 .192 
CEOAGEt 61.11 61 8.74  59.14 59 6.83  59.39 59.33 7.12 
OLDER64t .266 0 .198  .092 0 .293  .115 0 .319 
ROA t -0.07 0.01 0.42  0.04 0.04 0.07  0.02 0.04 0.16 
RETt -0.08 -0.11 0.47  0.16 0.07 0.46  0.13 0.06 0.47 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ΔROAt = Percentage change in return on assets from year t-1 to year t; 
ΔRETt = Percentage change in stock market returns year t-1 to year t; 
ΔROAt-1 = Percentage change in return on assets from year t-2 to year t-1; 
ΔRETt-1 = Percentage change in stock market returns year t-2 to year t-1; 
ΔCASHCOMPt = Percentage change in cash compensation to the CEO from year t-1 to year t; 
EW_PRIVATEt = Explicit incentive weight on private performance information held by the board 
in year t; 
CEOAGEt = CEO age in years in year t; 
OLDER64t = Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is older than 64 in year t 
and the value 0 otherwise. 
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where: 
 ARit  abnormal (excess) return of firm i at day t; 
  Rit  total daily stock returns of firm i, adjusted for dividends  
    and stock splits; 
  E(Rit)  returns of the respective size decile portfolio obtained   
    from  CRSP at day t.24 
 
Then for day t, the cross-sectional mean abnormal return is calculated as:  
 ∑
=
=
N
i
itt ARN
MAR
1
1
 (3.4) 
where N is the number of firms in the sub-samples PUBLIC, PRIVATE. 
For the event window ranging from day K to day L around the event date, CAR in 
each sub-sample is derived by: 
 ∑
=
=
L
Kt
tKL MARCAR  (3.5) 
I choose the event windows on a three day (-1, +1) and a six day (-1, +4) period 
relative to event day 0. For a univariate test assessing whether CAR in the sub-sample 
for the respective event window are significantly different from zero, the test statistic 
is: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∑
=
∧
)(
2
t
L
Kt
KLCAR MARSCARt KL  (3.6) 
Where 
∧
S )( tMAR is the time series standard deviation of MARs in the estimation 
period, which I choose as 290 trading days prior to the event day starting at day t=-300 
ranging to t=-10. For the specific estimation period, this standard deviation is given 
by: 
                                                 
24 Alternatively, I also estimate firm i’s abnormal daily stock performance by using the residuals from a market 
model regression where itAR
∧
= )( mtiiit RaR
∧∧∧ +− β over a period of 290 trading days (i.e. t=-300 to t=-10) 
prior to the event date and mtR equaling (i) daily returns of the S&P 500 index, and  (ii) the value weighted 
market portfolio (both obtained from CRSP). 
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3.3.2.3 Regression Analysis 
As stated in H3, I expect outsiders to react more negatively to CEO turnover 
announcements, the higher the ex-ante incentive weight on private measures. To test 
this, I focus on those turnover firms whose boards fix incentives weights ex-ante and 
run a regression that explains the cross sectional variance of firm excess returns. I 
estimate the firm specific CAR as a function of the ex-ante explicit incentive weight 
on private performance measures and control variables: 
 iiiKLi CONTROLSPRIVATEEWCAR εβββ +++= 210, _  (3.8) 
where: 
 CARi,KL   Cumulative abnormal returns for firm i measured  
     over event window K, L (-1, +1; -1,+4);25 
 EW_PRIVATE i   Explicit incentive weight on private performance  
     measures specified in the annual CEO bonus   
     contract written at the beginning of the fiscal year  
     in which the turnover is announced. 
  
 In line with H3, I expect β0 to be positive and significantly different from zero. 
That is, in the absence of explicit incentive weights on private measures, all CEO 
relevant performance signals are already recognized at the turnover date. This is 
followed by a positive stock price reaction, which, if present, appears in the intercept. 
 Next, I predict β1 to be negative and significantly different from zero. That is, the 
more the CEO change is motivated by private information the more negative the share 
price reaction to that event. 
 Following prior literature, I include control variables that potentially influence 
investors’ reactions to CEO turnover at announcement. I control for whether the 
turnover announcement takes place at the CEO age of 64 or 65, as firms commonly 
employ mandatory retirement practices around that age. Mahajan and Lummer (1993) 
show that markets react less negatively to CEO turnover announcements when these 
are part of a smooth CEO transition, of which mandatory turnover can be indicative. 
                                                 
25 Specifically, firm CARs are measured as: ∑
=
=
L
Kt
itKLi ARCAR ,  
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The variable RETIRE takes on the value of 1 if the CEO age is 64 or 65 at 
announcement date and 0 otherwise. In line with this reasoning, I also include the 
indicator variable ASSSUME, which takes on the value 1 if the turnover 
announcement indicates that the leaving CEO will assume a different position in the 
firm afterwards, and zero otherwise. Ceteris paribus, I expect that outsiders will react 
less negatively to announcements when the board believes that retaining the CEO 
within the firm is important.  
 Finally, I control for the firm’s strategic orientation along the defender – 
prospector continuum. Previous research shows that incentive weights on private 
performance measures in CEO contracts are driven by the firm’s strategic orientation, 
where prospector firms place greater emphasis on non-financial performance measures 
and board subjectivity, both being assumed to be private in this study. In case outsiders 
systematically react to the firm’s strategic orientation, then the incentive weight 
variable potentially captures effects that are triggered by strategy and not the 
information due to the incentive weight on private measures. To control for this 
potential endogeneity problem, the variable STRATEGY is included in the estimation 
of CAR and measured as a three item factor score, including a firm’s market-to-book, 
employees-to-sales and R&D spending-to-sales ratios (cf. Ittner et al. 1997). 
 As indicated by Roon and Veld (1998), estimating CAR such as in Equation (3.8) 
is unlikely to be efficient, because the ARit’s from Equation (3.3) measure firm i’s 
idiosyncratic risk, which is probably not homogeneous across all sample firms. That is, 
running Equation (3.8) using OLS violates its constant variance assumption resulting 
in biased estimators. I therefore obtain the standard deviation of firm i’s abnormal 
returns ∧ iσ over the estimation period (-300, -10) preceding the event date to obtain an 
estimator of firm i’s true abnormal returns’ variance. Then I apply Weighted Least 
Squares (WLS) to deflate each of the variables in Equation (3.8) by ∧ iσ  in order to 
obtain efficient estimates.26 
                                                 
26 Specifically, the WLS estimation takes the form:
∧∧∧∧∧ =+++=
i
i
ii
iiii
i uuControlsPRIVATEEWCAR
σ
ε
σ
β
σ
β
σ
β
σ
,_ 210
 
Bonus Contracts, Private Information and CEO Turnover 
51 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Turnover regressions 
Table 3.2 presents the marginal probabilities for the probit regression predicting the 
likelihood of a CEO turnover.27 The marginal probabilities reflect the change in the 
probability for an infinitesimal change in each of the independent continuous variables 
and the discrete change in the probability for the dummy variable OLDER64. I first 
run the regression without the bonus contract variables. The results in Column 3 show 
that both current accounting and market performance affects CEO turnover in the 
expected direction, i.e., poorer performance increases the likelihood of turnover.  
 Although past accounting and market performance also have a negative effect, 
these effects are only marginally significant. The marginal probabilities further show 
that accounting performance is a more important driver of turnover than market 
performance. Further, CEOs who are older than 64 are far more likely to leave office, 
while age as a continuous variable has no effect. Finally, the Pseudo R2 of the model 
equals 10.69%. 
 Column four of Table 3.2 presents the results after adding the contract variables 
and shows that current, but not past, accounting and market performance negatively 
affects turnover, while OLDER64 positively affects turnover, consistent with the 
results in Column three. More importantly, I find that the interaction term 
ΔCASHCOMPit ×EW_PRIVATEit is significantly negative. Furthermore, the marginal 
probability of the interaction effect indicates that the use of private information is 
economically relevant and dominates the turnover decision together with accounting 
performance. Finally, the Pseudo R2 of the model equals 16.61%, which is more than 
1.5 times that from the model excluding the contract variables.28  
 In sum, the decision of boards to change CEOs is structurally related to actual 
performance in view of actual bonus contracts used. If boards announce to use public 
measures only, then turnover is only related to actual public performance, especially 
accounting. If boards base cash compensation also on other signals that are private, 
then the impact of that performance is greater the greater the relative weight in the 
bonus contract. Consequently, I provide evidence for the argument that bonus 
contracts are used by boards of directors to signal performance dimensions that they 
use to make employment related decisions and hence to incentives. 
                                                 
27 All marginal effects are evaluated at the mean and the marginal effects related to the interaction term and its 
components are measured in line with the procedure described in Ai and Norton (2003). 
28 The above reported results are robust to the inclusion of industry dummies. 
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Table 3.2 
Probit Estimation of CEO Turnover (n=348) a 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
 ΔMarginal 
Probability 
 ΔMarginal 
Probability 
ΔROAit 
 
-  -0.70*** (2.97)   
-0.74*** 
(3.03) 
ΔROAit-1 
 
-  -0.20 (0.86)   
-0.14 
(0.61) 
ΔRETit 
 
-  -0.04** (1.93)   
-0.04** 
(1.95) 
ΔRETit-1 
 
-  -0.01 (0.52)   
-0.01 
(0.47) 
ΔCASHCOMPit 
 
?     0.04 (0.84) 
EW_PRIVATEit 
 
?      0.14* (1.65) 
ΔCASHCOMPit×EW_PRIVATEit  -      -0.84*** (3.03) 
CEOAGEit 
 
-  0.00
 
(0.15)   
-0.00 
(0.18) 
OLDER64it 
 
+  0.22*** (2.51)   
0.26*** 
(2.85) 
Pseudo R2 
 
  10.69%   16.61% 
aP(TURNOVERi,t+1=1)= β0+β1ΔRETit+β2ΔROAit+β3ΔCASHCOMPit+β4EW_PRIVATEit+ 
β5ΔCASHCOMPit×EW_PRIVATEit+β6AGEit+β7OLDER64it+β8ΔRETit-1+ β9ΔROAit-1+ εit 
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (one-tailed for predicted 
signs, two-tailed test otherwise, Z statistics in parentheses).  
The variables are defined as follows: 
ΔROAt = Percentage change in return on assets from year t-1 to year t; 
ΔRETt = Percentage change in stock market returns year t-1 to year t; 
ΔROAt-1 = Percentage change in return on assets from year t-2 to year t-1; 
ΔRETt-1 = Percentage change in stock market returns year t-2 to year t-1; 
ΔCASHCOMPt = Percentage change in cash compensation to the CEO from year t-1 to year t; 
EW_PRIVATEt = Explicit incentive weight on private performance information held by the 
board in year t; 
CEOAGEt = CEO age in years in year t; 
OLDER64t = Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is older than 64 in year t 
and the value 0 otherwise. 
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3.4.1.1 Robustness check 
 To test the robustness of the results, I replace changes in raw firm performance 
with industry adjusted accounting and stock performance, as boards typically compare 
firm performance relative to that of peers in making CEO retention decisions (e.g. 
Barro and Barro 1990; Engel et al. 2003). The presence of relative performance 
evaluation potentially affects the interpretation of results if the board’s judgment of 
relative accounting and stock performance rather than the expected evaluation of 
privately observed CEO performance is reflected by the interaction term 
ΔCASHCOMPit×EW_PRIVATEit. I calculate industry adjusted changes of ROA and 
stock returns by subtracting mean (median) industry ROA and stock returns from each 
firm specific observation of ROA and stock returns, respectively. 
 The inferences drawn from the results (untabulated) are identical to those based 
on the regressions including raw firm accounting and stock performance, both using 
industry mean as well as median performance as the base for adjustment. Industry 
adjusted accounting and stock performance as well as the interaction of compensation 
changes and incentive weights on private measures remain negatively and significantly 
related to the marginal turnover probability. The only noteworthy difference is that the 
current change in ROA is about half in size compared to the regression employing raw 
firm performance and is slightly less significant.  
 Overall, the additional analyses indicate that boards apply relative performance 
evaluation in CEO replacement decisions but that such adjustment is not 
systematically related to boards’ evaluations of privately observed CEO performance.  
3.4.2 Event study, univariate results 
Table 3.3 summarizes the univariate results for the total sample of 66 cases and the 
partitioned samples PUBLIC and PRIVATE, were the CAR reported are based on the 
corresponding size deciles portfolio as the performance benchmark.29 Panel A gives an 
overview of the samples that include turnovers announced along with confounding 
news, while Panel B reports the clean samples. In the total sample, CAR is not 
statistically discernible from zero in neither of the event windows, which is in line 
with unconditioned announcement effects reported by prior studies (e.g. Mahajan and 
Lummer 1988; Warner et al. 1988). In PRIVATE, CAR is negative and significantly 
different from zero in both the sample including confounding news and the clean 
sample, and in both of the event windows. 
                                                 
29 Results for the market-model returns (untabulated) lead to the same inferences as the ones reported. 
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 Specifically, in the sample including confounding news, the abnormal returns are 
-3.3% and -4.75% in the three and six day window, respectively. In the clean sample, 
the abnormal returns portrayed are even higher, with -5% and -7% in the 
corresponding event windows. Hence, the univariate results for excess returns in 
PRIVATE provide strong support for my argument that CEO turnovers conditioned on 
private information held by the board signal negative performance to outsiders, who, 
in turn, adjust expectations about firm value downwards. 
 In PUBLIC, CAR is positive but not significantly different from zero in neither 
of the event windows in the confounded sample. In the clean sample, however, CAR is 
positive and significant in both the three and six day event windows (3.5 %, 5 %). This 
is consistent with my expectation that CEO turnovers based on publicly observable 
measures deliver a positive signal to investors. This finding adds to prior studies 
finding positive market reactions to CEO turnovers when bad performance prior to the 
event was fully known by outsiders (e.g. Bonnier and Bruner 1989). 
3.4.3 Event study, regression results 
Table 3.4 presents the results for the cross sectional variation in CAR for different 
time windows. Panel A reports regression results for the sample including confounding 
news, Panel B presents results in the “clean” sample. In the different specifications, the 
coefficient on EW_PRIVATE (β1) is negative and significant, supporting the argument 
that the negative signal at turnover announcement is stronger the more important 
private measures become in bonus contracts. For example, the regression results 
depicted in Panel B, Column 3 indicate that firm CAR over a three day period around 
announcement is about -13 % when a board fixes half of the incentive weight on 
private measures. 
 Regarding the results for the sole use of public measures (β0), the specifications 
including control variables do indicate that the intercept takes on the predicted positive 
sign, but show no significance at conventional levels, which might be due to the small 
sample size and degrees of freedom. In contrast, regressing CAR on EW_PRIVATE 
only, β0 is positive and significant over the six day event window (Panel B, Column 5). 
Although taking on the predicted sign in most of the cases, none of the control 
variables is significant. 
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 Overall, I provide evidence that the negative signal of CEO turnovers 
conditioned on private measures increases with the explicit incentive weight on private 
measures so that outsiders react more negatively to the event. Combining the 
univariate results with the regression results, I provide evidence that markets 
negatively react to turnovers, once boards use private information in bonus contracts 
and positively react to turnovers on public information that has already been 
recognized before the event. The extent to which the above described effects occur, 
depend on the relative importance of private vs. public information in bonus contracts. 
3.5 Summary and conclusion 
Firms design cash compensation contracts consistent with principal-agent predictions 
(Core et al. 2003). However as recent research documents, the incentives provided by 
cash compensation are low as compared to the effects of equity ownership. This raises 
the question why firms administer costly bonus programs if they would not influence 
management behavior. In this chapter, I argue that boards can delegate some decisions 
to capital markets, like that of CEO equity compensation, but still have to make some 
decisions internally, like the decision to continue or quit the employment relationship 
Table 3.4 
WLS regression for the cross-sectional variation in excess returns to shareholders as a function 
of explicit incentive weights on private performance measures in CEO annual bonus contracts a 
Panel A: Sample including confounding news (n=49) 
  CoefficientEstimate (t-Ratio) 
Variable Predicted CARi,[-1, +1] CARi,[-1, +4] 
INTERCEPT + 0.1 
(0.65) 
0.006 
(0.25) 
0.014 
(0.78) 
0.026 
(0.93) 
EW_PRIVATE - -0.115* 
(-1.63) 
-0.126** 
(-1.71) 
-0.158*** 
(2.05) 
-0.172*** 
(-2.15) 
RETIRE +  -0.003 (-0.13) 
 -0.186 
(-0.58) 
ASSUME +  0.118 
(0.42) 
 -0.005 
(-0.19) 
STRATEGY ?  0.011 
(0.803) 
 0.016 
(0.96) 
Adj. R2  3.41% -1.5% 6.37% 4.01% 
(Continued on next page) 
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with a current CEO. I further argue that boards, in making this decision, are likely to 
gain CEO related information from measures other than noisy price measures. 
 I advance the hypothesis that boards can benefit from communicating desired 
dimensions of managerial performance to CEOs by means of annual bonus contracts. 
Thereby they can signal to executives which measures serve as standards for 
evaluating performance and will also become relevant in the decision of whether or 
not employment should be continued. As loosing the CEO position results in several 
negative consequences for the individual, a systematic link illustrates that bonus 
contracts create significant incentives. The results of the empirical analyses support 
this view, by showing that the effect of non-price measures on the likelihood of 
observing CEO turnover is affected by the extent to which different performance 
dimensions (public and private) are contracted upon in annual bonus contracts. 
Table 3.4 (continued) 
Panel B: Clean sample (n=35) 
INTERCEPT + 0.019 
(1.15) 
0.0001 
(0.01) 
0.034** 
(1.72) 
0.027 
(0.96) 
EW_PRIVATE - -0.267*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.28*** 
(-3.31) 
-0.32*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.34*** 
(-3.88) 
RETIRE +  0.0133 
(0.44) 
 -0.0008 
(-0.28) 
ASSUME +  0.027 
(0.95) 
 0.016 
(0.51) 
STRATEGY ?  0.015 
(1.07) 
 0.0184 
(1.19) 
Adj. R2  23% 21% 27% 21% 
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (one-tailed test for 
predictions, two-tailed test otherwise).  
a
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The Variables are defined as follows: 
EW_PRIVATE = Explicit incentive weight on private performance information held by the 
board in year t; 
RETIRE = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the CEO leaves the firm at the age of 
64 or older; and the value 0 otherwise; 
ASSUME = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the turnover announcement indicates 
that the leaving CEO will assume a different position in the firm afterwards, 0 
otherwise; 
STRATEGY = The firm’s prospective strategy measured as a factor score of the ratios (1) 
research and development to sales (2) market-to-book value, and (3) the 
employees to sales. 
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 Further, I investigate whether investors process the disclosure of performance 
measures and the incentive weights attached to them in forming expectations about the 
impact of CEO turnover on firm value. The results of an event study of abnormal 
returns to investors around CEO turnover announcements support my hypothesis that 
turnovers likely to be motivated by public measures provide a positive signal about the 
board to outsiders, resulting in positive abnormal returns. The results are further 
supportive of my argument that turnovers based on private information convey a 
negative signal about the CEO, which results in negative share price reactions upon 
announcement. 
 In sum, boards of directors play a crucial role in providing incentives not only 
because they determine the optimal level of equity incentives, but also because they 
hire and fire management. I show that the care taken in designing annual bonus 
contracts can be explained by its link with governance decisions and indicate that 
performance measurement issues are an important part of the corporate governance 
process. 
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Chapter 4  
The Incentive and Signaling Effects of Annual Bonus 
Schemes: Evidence from Firm Innovation 
Abstract 
In this study, I examine whether the structure of annual bonus contracts for corporate 
CEOs fosters innovation within the firm. Boards of directors observe CEO initiatives 
and their effects on performance dimensions not instantly reflected by accounting 
numbers and may base bonus payments on such private signals about the creation of 
firm value. In doing so, boards provide CEO incentives to spur firm innovation. I 
predict that private performance measures in CEO annual bonus contracts are 
positively related to firm innovation. Secondly, private performance measures in bonus 
contracts result in cash payments to CEOs containing information not captured by 
accounting numbers. Firms can thereby convey private information about CEO 
performance to financial markets, allowing the firm’s share price to adjust to the 
additional information. I argue that this renders CEO equity holdings more sensitive to 
value enhancing actions, which subsequently result in a higher incentive intensity of 
equity. I predict that innovation is positively related to the interplay of private 
performance measures in annual bonus contracts and CEO equity holdings. The 
empirical results based on patent citation measures and incentive contract data for 197 
CEOs of public U.S., R&D intensive firms confirm my expectations. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The goal of this study is to investigate whether firm innovation can be systematically 
traced to the CEO’s performance evaluation made by boards of directors, and 
specifically whether or not performance dimensions unobserved by firm outsiders are 
inherent in the evaluation of the CEO.  
 Innovation is a key factor to securing the profitability of firms and growth of 
economies (Schumpeter 1936; Solow 1956). For corporations, the ultimate goal of 
R&D expenditures is to generate new knowledge for commercial purposes. Outsiders 
recognize the value of new products and technological advances, attributing higher 
value to more innovative firms (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2005). Innovation is a 
multi facetted concept which can differ significantly in attributes like economic value 
or technical sophistication. For example, CEOs may invest in R&D to fund pet 
projects or to merely broaden the scope of firm activities. Given the importance of 
innovation to secure future profitability, the question if and how managers are 
motivated to secure innovation is important (e.g. Kachelmeier, Reichert, and 
Williamson 2007; Xue 2007).  
 One option to promote innovative behavior is to provide management with firm 
equity, for example by providing managers with company stock or stock options. 
Stock prices presumably incorporate the impact of innovation on firm value (e.g. 
Lerner and Wulf 2006). However, providing innovation oriented incentives via equity 
ownership is likely to be problematic, because investors need not be sufficiently 
informed about the firm’s prospects with regard to the identification of innovative 
processes or products. For instance, firms deliberately keep details of research efforts 
confidential so that the value of innovative activity often requires significant time 
spans to become obvious to outsiders.  
 Still, CEOs undergo annual performance evaluations by corporate boards that are 
likely to gain more innovation related information than capital markets (Lipton and 
Lorsch 1992; Bushman and Smith 2001). This is especially true when the assessment 
of desirable CEO initiatives (a situation of which innovation is representative) is per-se 
difficult and when their effects are not directly reflected in financial statements 
(Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith 1996).  
 As indicated earlier in this dissertation, the performance dimensions used in 
evaluating the CEO are formally represented by performance measures specified in 
CEO bonus programs. While direct monetary incentives in the form of cash payments 
are low, boards’ evaluations provide significant CEO incentives as they are related to 
the CEO turnover and continuation decision (chapter 3 of this dissertation). In 
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reviewing CEO performance, boards frequently consider private information about the 
CEO’s impact on factors that are “competitively sensitive” or reward “the attainment 
of technological advances”. I argue that, if innovation is an objective of the firm, the 
evaluation of CEOs based on such privately observed measures should provide CEO 
incentives to secure innovation, and expect the presence of private performance 
measures in annual bonus contracts to have a positive relation with firm innovation. 
 A further implication of boards evaluating the CEO based on private 
performance information is that cash payments from boards to CEOs signal value 
creation from the firm’s internal environment to capital markets (Hayes and Schaefer 
2000). Hayes and Schaefer (2005) show that bonus payments can credibly signal 
private information about valuable CEO actions, without disclosing ‘too much’ (e.g. 
confidential or competitively sensitive) information. Innovations vary in their value, 
and the value of individual projects undertaken is unknown by investors. Based on 
this, I expect that bonus payments in R&D intensive firms convey value potential of 
the firm’s innovative endeavors to capital markets, if private measures are used. This 
renders a firm’s share price more sensitive to the creation of valuable innovations, 
which ultimately increases the incentive intensity of existing CEO equity holdings.  
 I test these predictions using a data set of 197 U.S. publicly listed, R&D intensive 
firms, in the period from 1998 to 2000. Following prior studies (Ittner et al. 1997; Said 
et al. 2003), I assess boards’ reliance on private measures in evaluating CEO 
performance by reading and coding bonus compensation practices described in the 
SEC Proxy Statements. Firm financial data is obtained from Compustat. I 
operationalize firm innovation using information on patents granted by the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (UPSTO), obtained from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) database described in detail by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2002). 
Four measures depicting firm innovation are included in the analyses. Apart from 
patent counts, I concentrate on citations based measures to capture patents’ technical 
sophistication (originality, generality) and impact on future patents (Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg 2002). 
 I examine the incentive effects of private performance measures on firm 
innovation by investigating the association between the innovation measures and an 
indicator variable capturing whether or not boards opt to include private measures of 
future oriented CEO actions in bonus contracts. I construct a matched sample of firms 
that differ in their use of private measures, but are similar with respect to operational 
and strategic configurations that theoretically drive the use of private measure for 
incentive purposes (Dehija and Waba 2002). In doing so, I account for the endogenous 
nature of the choice of performance measures used to evaluate the CEO, as not all 
firms are equally likely to profit from universal performance measure combinations 
(e.g. Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith 1996). As a result of this procedure, I divide 
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sample firms into ones making expected, or alternatively, surprising performance 
measure choices conditional on determinants of private measures.  
 The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, mean innovation is compared among 
the two sets of firms with similar characteristics except for the use of private measures. 
Second, I regress innovation measures on an indicator variable for the use of private 
measures in the sample of expected private measure users. To test the second 
expectation regarding the signaling effects of cash payments leading to increased 
incentive intensity of equity holdings, I add the interaction of private measures and 
CEO equity incentives.   
 The empirical results support my predictions. Firms using private performance 
measures are awarded more patents of greater technological significance and impact 
on future patents if their CEO evaluation practices are in line with theoretical 
predictions. On the contrary, companies that are unlikely to profit from private 
measures but still employ them do not benefit in terms of innovation. Consistent with 
my second hypothesis, the interaction of private measures and CEO equity incentives 
is positively related to the amount of patent awards as well as the technical 
sophistication and future impact of the awarded patents. Hence, CEO equity holdings 
provide stronger incentives to innovate, if private knowledge about innovative output 
is conveyed to financial markets. Additional analyses reveal that these effects are 
economically significant. 
 The following study adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, 
accounting studies have so far focused on the effect of compensation packages on 
R&D expenditures (e.g. Baber, Fairfield and Haggard 1991; Dechow and Sloan 1991; 
Cheng 2005). This study shows that R&D spending is not per-se informative about 
firm innovation and that incentives provided by boards are important in the 
transformation of R&D investments into innovation. It further adds to research from 
other disciplines, by showing that incentive issues are inherent in the innovation 
process. 
 Second, this chapter adds to an ongoing discussion about the role of boards of 
directors in influencing CEO behavior. For example, Hall and Liebmann (1998) and 
Core, Guay, and Verrechia (2003) show that CEO wealth is predominantly influenced 
by her holdings of firm equity, suggesting that the ultimate task of evaluating the CEO 
for the sake of providing incentives is imposed on capital markets. However, apart 
from determining the optimal level of equity incentives, other important decisions rest 
upon boards. They may base such decisions on information that is not necessarily held 
by capital markets. For example, chapter 3 of this dissertation indicates that board 
evaluations of the CEO are systematically related to CEO firing, thereby providing 
high-powered incentives due to several negative repercussions linked to that decision. 
The Incentive and Signaling Effects of Annual Bonus Schemes 
63 
In this context, the present study provides evidence of the effects of governance 
decisions on the achievement of firm objectives.   
 Last but not least, the present study is among the first empirical studies providing 
evidence for the use of CEO evaluations (and the resulting cash payments) to credibly 
signal private and potentially confidential information to capital markets (e.g. Moers, 
Peek, and Roomberg 2007). 
 This study continues as follows. Section 4.2 provides the hypothesis 
development. Section 4.3 describes the data and empirical specifications, section 4.4 
presents the results, section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 Previous research 
Investors react positively to R&D spending and patents filed, representing firms’ 
innovative inputs and observable effects, respectively (e.g. Griliches 1981; Hall, Jaffe 
and Trajtenberg 2005). There is a vast theoretical and empirical literature in various 
fields explaining the propensity of corporations to innovate, ranging from firm-specific 
effects such as size (Schumpeter 1942), competition and market structure (e.g. Cohen 
and Levin 1989), to the impact of firms’ integration in R&D networks (e.g. Gomez-
Casseres, Hagedoorn and Jaffe 2006).  
 The accounting literature has so far predominantly focused on management 
incentives to invest in R&D as a necessary means of firm innovation. By allocating 
R&D funds among business units, executives are in charge of driving firm innovation. 
Personal motives of corporate management can deviate from overall firm objectives, 
resulting in opportunistic cut-backs on R&D spending, for example in the presence of 
horizon and myopia problems (e.g. Baber, Fairfield and Haggard 1991; Dechow and 
Sloan 1991). Compensation arrangements between boards and CEOs can mitigate 
these problems to assure R&D spending (Cheng 2005). 
 However, variation in R&D expenses does not per-se imply variation in 
innovation. Investors are ultimately interested in generated innovative outcomes but 
not the amount of the R&D expenditure itself. Firm innovations vary significantly in 
attributes like economic value and technical sophistication. Besides, CEOs may fund 
individual projects due to a feeling of personal attachment, the reluctance to consider 
certain investments as sunk costs, or invest in R&D to increase firm size (Lerner and 
Wulf 2006). Thus, understanding the dynamics how R&D investments are transformed 
into valuable innovations is important (Hall et al. 2005; Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002).  
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 Evidence related to the effect of incentives on innovation is scarce except for two 
notable studies. Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) find at most weak evidence for 
R&D managers’ equity ownership being related to innovative activity within their 
respective business units. Lerner and Wulf (2006) document that higher levels of 
equity held by business unit managers in centralized R&D organizations are associated 
with more patents of higher originality receiving more future citations.  
 While these studies provide insights into the impact of compensation 
arrangements on firm innovation, two somewhat questionable assumptions are made. 
First, financial markets are sufficiently informed about the value of innovations and 
second, stock prices are sensitive to actions of lower hierarchy management. However, 
in the absence of value relevant signals, financial markets are unlikely to immediately 
adjust share prices to presumably privately known patent value and the impact of 
lower hierarchical managers’ actions on share price is likely to be low.30   
 This study takes on an alternative approach to examine incentive effects on firm 
innovation. First, the analysis is conducted at the CEO level. Although not directly 
being involved in the day-to-day activities that result in innovative outputs, CEOs are 
responsible for vital activities inherent in the innovation process of which the 
allocation of financial resources and the selection of promising R&D projects are but 
two examples. Stock prices capture the effects of such activities with a considerable 
time lag diluting the incentives to innovate provided by equity. Yet, CEOs undergo 
annual performance evaluations by the board (Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Bushman and 
Smith 2001). Boards hold more CEO related information than capital markets and in 
evaluating his actions, often rely on privately observed performance measures (Hayes 
and Schaefer 2000).  Performance reviews, in turn, provide significant CEO incentives 
as they are related to CEO compensation and continuation decisions. Given the 
importance of innovation to corporations, it consequently seems logical that the 
board’s monitoring and rewarding of innovation oriented behavior triggers 
corresponding CEO actions and thus, firm innovation.  
 Further, the measurement and reward of privately observed CEO performance 
has also important implications on the information conveyed to capital markets by 
CEO cash payments and thus the expectations on which stock prices are based. 
 In the following I will draw on agency predictions to formulate two testable 
hypotheses concerning above considerations.  
                                                 
30 One possibility for finding an association between R&D managers’ equity holdings and firm innovation is that 
equity holdings and firm innovation are jointly related to factors outside the structural model, which results in 
endogeneity problems. For instance, Lerner and Wulf (2006) do not account for the endogenous nature of equity 
held by business unit managers. Alternative explanations for their significant findings may be that retaining and 
attracting qualified managers are major concerns for firms where expected innovation is high, resulting in higher 
levels of equity awards.  
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4.2.2  Private performance measures in CEO bonus contracts and firm innovation 
Agency theory provides important insights into how CEO incentives provided by 
annual bonus contracts can induce CEOs to exert innovation oriented actions. Agency 
theory focuses on incentive contracts between firm owners and managers. The aim of 
these contracts is to motivate managers to take actions that are in line with firm 
objectives. As management actions are unobservable to owners, contracts are written 
on performance measures serving as indicators of the agent’s action choice. An 
important concern is how well firms’ financial statements account for the 
consequences of value enhancing actions taken by the manager, as this has 
implications for the optimal selection of performance measures. Firms adopting a 
long-term orientation to value creation experience a considerable time lag until desired 
contemporaneous actions positively translate into financial results (e.g. Banker, Potter 
and Srinivasan 2000). In this case, exclusive reliance on accounting performance 
measures directs management actions away from long-term value creating actions to 
day-to-day activities realizing short-term financial outcomes (Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1991). Agency theory suggests that performance rewards should be based on all 
measures that are informative about managers’ actions (Banker and Datar 1989; 
Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Feltham and Xie 1994).  
 The impact of CEO actions on the creation of innovation is difficult, if not 
impossibly accounted for by performance measures that are obvious to outsiders (Jaffe 
and Trajtenberg 2002). This calls for private performance measures of boards’ 
subjective evaluations and their inclusion in incentive contracts (e.g. Bushman et al. 
1996). Agency theory predicts that this establishes a balance in the trade-off between 
day-to-day activities and innovation-oriented long-term actions. 
 Based on the above, I formulate the following hypothesis. 
H1: Firm innovation is positively related to the incidence of private 
performance measures in CEO annual bonus contracts.  
4.2.3 Signalling effects of bonus payments on private performance measures 
Hayes and Schaefer (2000) show that bonus payments beyond levels justified by 
firms’ observable accounting and stock price performance are positively related to 
future operating performance. Bonus payments that are conditioned on private 
performance information observed by the board can be a credible signal of value 
enhancing actions of the CEO. This influences investors’ expectations about firm 
value, stock price, and ultimately the value of equity held by the CEO. 
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 Hayes and Schaefer (2005) show analytically that investors can infer the 
magnitude of “good news” about unobserved performance from bonus amounts paid. 
In their model this signal is credible, as the authors require payments to be sufficiently 
high to discourage firms without private good news to mimic real good news firms. 
They further point to the implicit nature of contracts written on private information, 
which renders the contract non-enforceable in court. Therefore, higher potential 
bonuses increase the owners’ temptation to renege on the contract, bounding bonus 
payments within the two limits described.  
 The results of Hayes and Schaefer (2005) indicate why private measures and 
equity holdings can be complements, especially when the firm is constrained in its 
ability to signal information to capital markets in a way that is not pertinent to 
decisions by competitors. For example, dense competition induces firm reluctance to 
instantly inform investors about strategic initiatives or new product development, in 
order to shorten time spans for competitors to take responsive actions. Still, firms may 
want to credibly communicate internal value creation to capital markets because 
investors will adjust the firm’s stock price accordingly. In Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation, I show empirically that boards’ internal assessments of CEO performance 
are communicated to outsiders via cash payments and that investors use this signal in 
forming expectations of firm value. 
 The above described mechanism affects CEO incentives because share price and 
thus, the value of the CEO’s equity holding becomes more sensitive to his own actions 
whenever these are signalled to the capital market via bonus payments made. In the 
context of innovation, this leads to the prediction that, at a given level of equity held, 
CEOs have greater incentives to increase the value of innovation in the presence of 
private measures compared to a situation when private measures are absent. This leads 
to the second hypothesis: 
H2: The impact of CEO equity incentives on innovation is higher in the 
presence of private performance measures in CEO annual bonus 
contracts compared to the absence of private measures.  
4.3 Sample, method, and variable measurement 
4.3.1 Sample selection 
The analysis is based on CEO incentive contracts described in the compensation 
section of SEC Proxy Statements (DEF 14a). Proxy statements provide information 
about specified performance measures and specifically whether the board chooses to 
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condition bonus payments on private performance measures that stem from its direct 
monitoring of the CEO. The sample consists of publicly listed firms included in 
EXECUCOMP without a change in the CEO position in the period from 1998 to 2002. 
Thereby, I obtain an initial sample of 2,895 observations for 579 firms across five 
years. The full sample initially reduces to 2,575 observations due to three sources of 
missing compensation-related information: lacking proxy information (63 obs.), 
companies not administering annual incentive programs (127 obs.), and missing 
indication of performance measures (130 obs.). I merge the remaining observations 
with stock market and financial statement data obtained from COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP, by firm and fiscal year, which reduces the sample to 2,073 observations due to 
missing information. I delete firms without R&D expenses over the time period as 
indicated by COMPUSTAT, because investment in R&D is a necessary precondition 
to generate innovation. The focus on R&D intensive firms to study firm innovation has 
precedence in the literature (e.g. Holthausen et al. 1995). 1,625 observations drop out 
of the sample, because the respective firms report no R&D expenses over the sample 
period.  
 An additional data constraint is connected with how I operationalize the output of 
firms’ innovative performance. Following prior studies, I assess data on patents 
awarded to corporations by the USPTO. I obtain the necessary information from the 
NBER patent database, which contains details on patents granted from 1963 to 2002. 
Due to an average time lag of two years between the filing and awarding of patents, I 
link patents awarded in 2002 to bonus contract and other firm characteristics in 2000 
(e.g. Lerner and Wulf 2007).31 Due to this requirement, 418 observations of the 2001-
2002 period are deleted, because a major part of patent applications were still under 
review at that time. Lastly, 12 observations are deleted due to missing COMPUSTAT 
data. The resulting sample encompasses 520 observations, for 197 firms across three 
years in 10 different industries, as classified by two digit SIC code.  
4.3.2 Dependent Variables 
As indicated above, I operationalize firm innovation by assessing heterogeneity in 
different attributes of firm patents filed by the USPTO. The choice to use patent data 
as a proxy for innovation is motivated by the following reasons. First, patent data 
include references to previous patents, fulfilling an important legal function by 
identifying what portion of the individual patent application is not covered by “prior 
art”. Patents are therefore per-se informative of the construct innovation as they 
                                                 
31 The economics literature argues that R&D expenditures and the following patent applications are generated 
within narrow time spans (Hall, Griliches, and Hausman, 1986). Likewise, I assume that proposed CEO 
incentive effects on innovation become instantly evident to boards. 
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indicate whether or not a specific idea or product extends existing knowledge. Second, 
patent measures are subject to thorough screening by engineers, patent lawyers and 
patent office officials, which results in standardized criteria to determine the novelty of 
patent applications. In contrast, alternative innovative output measures (most notably 
new product introductions) hinge on the firm’s internal classification of what 
constitutes a new product (Hagedoorn and Cloodt 2003). Third, the NBER data base is 
the most extensive publicly accessible data on firms’ innovative activity, experiencing 
high acceptance and wide use in the economics and management literatures. 32 
 The economics literature assumes that not every patent filed is equally valuable 
and proposes citation based measures of patents’ technological significance and impact 
as proxies for the value added by patents (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1998; 
Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002).33 Patents of technological significance yield broad 
commercial applicability, making them valuable for businesses. Two prominent 
measures capturing technological significance are originality and generality. First, a 
patent is said to be more original if it draws upon a broader array of technologies 
among earlier patents it refers to. Patent i’s originality is measured as one minus the 
Herfindahl Index of the citations made to antecedent patents across different 
technology classes. Specifically, the measure is calculated as: 
 ∑−= jn
j
iji mYORIGINALIT
21  (4.1) 
Where mij denotes the percentage of citations made by patent i that belongs to patent 
class j. Thus, if a patent cites previous patents that belong to a narrow set of 
technologies, the originality score will be low, whereas drawing upon a wide set of 
                                                 
32 Although patent data offers a variety of appealing features, potential drawbacks are in order, as well. Most 
notably, firms may not actively patent innovations when the potential of imitations by competitors are low. Next 
to that, firms may also not apply for patents to disguise innovative efforts over longer time spans (Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg 2002). In order to affect the analysis at hand, either of the two motives would have to systematically 
translate into incentive design choices of interest. However, although these motives may affect the propensity to 
patent, they are unlikely to affect innovation oriented incentives, as firms would still benefit from their use. That 
is, even if motives against patenting innovations were present among sample firms, such motives would merely 
translate as unsystematic noise into the analysis. 
33 Citation measures account for the fact that research activity of firms, just like academic research, is an ongoing 
process in which a technical or knowledge based novelty builds upon prior knowledge over time (the “ancestors” 
of a patent). To get a patent awarded, firms have to convincingly state why the innovation at hand is a nontrivial 
and useful contribution to the previous state of knowledge. In this process, prior patents need to be cited to 
delimit the property rights awarded by the patent. This implies that patents awarded may also receive varying 
numbers of citations of different technologies from patents to follow (the “descendants” of a patent). Using the 
research analogy again, one can draw value implications by assessing patterns of patents’ ancestors and 
descendents, in a comparable way as inferring a research publication’s “value” by references made and received 
later on (Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002). 
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technologies results in a high originality score.34 The variable ORIGINAL is computed 
as the mean originality measure for all patents awarded to a firm in every year. 
 Quite similar, the variable GENERAL is the mean generality of awarded patents. 
An individual patent i’s generality refers to the broadness of technology classes of 
descending patents citing patent i: 
 ∑−= jn
j
iji rGENERALITY
21  (4.2) 
Where rij denotes the percentage of citations received by patent i that belongs to patent 
class j. Again, if a patent is cited by patents that belong to a narrow set of technologies, 
the generality score will be low, whereas receiving citations from diverse technologies 
results in a high generality score. As noted by Hall (2002), these measures tempt to 
increase mechanically with the number of citations made and received. I apply the 
correction proposed by Hall (2002) to deflate these measures by citations made and 
received.35  
 I proxy for patent impact by calculating the mean number of citations received by 
the firm’s patents awarded in a given year (IMPACT). More valuable patents are 
assumed to more heavily affect inventions to come, which increases their likelihood of 
being cited by future patents more often (Hall et al. 2005).  
 Lastly, I calculate the variable PATENT_COUNT to measure a firm’s patent 
output in a given proxy year, by calculating the sum of all patents filed at the UPSTO 
per year, conditional on the patent actually being awarded later. This measure has 
precedence in related studies (Holthausen et al. 1995; Lerner and Wulf 2006). The 
innovation literature suggests that more patents awarded are indicative of higher 
innovative effort, but allow no per-se implications about innovativeness of individual 
patents (Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002). With respect to this, I leave the question whether 
or not long-term incentives are associated with more patent awards open to empirical 
examination. 
                                                 
34 Suppose, for example, that a patent refers to a total of five earlier patents from four different technology 
classes and that two citations are made to a certain technology class and the remaining three citations are made to 
three different technology classes. The resulting originality score of the respective patent would be calculated as:  
1-[(2/5)2+(1/5)2+(1/5)2+(1/5)2] = 18/25 
35 Specifically, the estimator 
1
1
−
−⋅=∧
N
HHINη is an unbiased estimator of η, which is the true population 
herfindahl index of interest (in this case the herfindahl indices of originality and generality). N is the citations 
made and received for originality and generality, respectively. HHI is the biased estimator of the summation in 
(4.1) and (4.2). 
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4.3.3 Independent Variables 
4.3.3.1 Private performance measures in CEO annual bonus contracts 
The interest of this study lies on the incentive effects of private performance measures 
on valuable innovations created by firms. To capture the independent variable of 
interest, I read all individual proxy statements, together with two researchers. The 
variable USE_PM takes on the value 1 if boards indicate that bonus payments to the 
CEO (partly) depend on their private information of the CEO’s long-term oriented 
actions. Examples include “innovation”, “strategic positioning”, “achievement of 
strategic objectives”, “impact on long-term value”, and “leadership”. The mean of the 
variable USE_PM equals 60 per cent (313 obs.), of which 94 per cent (294 obs.) 
exhibit private performance measures in combination with accounting performance 
measures, and 6 per cent (19 obs.) rely on private performance measures only. Table 
2.1 (Panel B) of chapter 2 provides an overview of excerpts from proxy statements that 
are representative of private measures in CEO annual bonus contracts. 
4.3.3.2 Equity incentives 
I measure the variable EQUITY_INC by calculating the sensitivity of the CEO’s 
equity portfolio to stock price using the method described in Core and Guay (2002).  
4.3.4 Empirical specification and estimation technique 
Based on the hypotheses and the above description of variables, I estimate the 
following equations:   
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(4.4) 
where INNOVATION represents the innovation measures presented earlier. I estimate 
equations (4.3) and (4.4) by pooling all observations in Tobit regressions, because a 
significant number of observations in each of the innovation variables has the value 0. 
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The existence of such a corner solution potentially causes biased OLS estimators for 
which Tobit adjusts by taking the probability of individual response values being 
greater than 0 into account (Wooldridge 2002). Year and industry fixed effects are 
included to control for unobserved variation of firm innovation across years and 
industries. Further, I include the variable EQUITY_INC in the estimation of (4.3) to 
control for direct effects of equity incentives on innovation (Holthausen et al. 1995; 
Lerner and Wulf 2006). For ease of interpretation, I center EQUITY_INC at the mean 
so that the coefficient for USE_PM in equation (4.4) reflects the effect of USE_PM for 
the sample average of equity incentives. Hypothesis 1 (2) predicts that the coefficient 
for γ1 (γ3) in (4.3) ((4.4)) is positive.  
 I also control for the possibility that the choice variable USE_PM causes 
endogeneity within the structural model (4.3) and (4.4).36 One remedy for the 
endogeneity problem is to control for variables affecting the choice and the dependent 
variable alike. However, as there is no guarantee for the inclusion of all relevant 
control variables in equations (4.3) and (4.4), I also apply the propensity matching 
technique described by Deheija and Wahba (2002) to assess variation in innovation of 
similar firms making different performance measure choices. This takes into account 
that firms are not equally likely to profit from the incentives provided by private 
measures.37 Before turning to the results of the main analysis, I describe the propensity 
matching approach in more detail in the next section.  
4.3.5 The endogenous nature of private measures in CEO evaluations 
An ideal test isolating the effects of bonus contract design would be to compare a 
firm’s innovative activity conditional on optimal contracts with its own innovation had 
it used economically infeasible contracts. As this is implausible, an alternative is to 
assume that not all firms optimize compensation practices all of the time, and at least 
sometimes exhibit contracting wise disequilibrium. This allows differences in 
innovation to be examined by assessing the extent to which innovation performance of 
firms behaving as predicted is superior to that of firms making surprising contracting 
choices (cf. Hogan and Lewis 2005). To do so, I will apply the propensity matching 
technique described by Deheija and Wahba (2002). This method is appropriate when 
multiple matching characteristics that theoretically drive a choice variable are present. 
The propensity score is the likelihood of observing private performance measures in 
                                                 
36 For detailed discussions see, for example, Chenhall and Moers (2007), and Moers (2006). 
37 For instance, firms pursuing strategies aimed at maximizing contemporaneous cash flows may invest in R&D 
due to a demand for relatively basic innovations that concern refinements of already existing processes and 
products (Davelaar and Nijkamp 1989). In this case, valuable CEO actions have a contemporaneous effect on 
financial performance, rendering forward looking private measures superfluous. On the contrary, firms taking on 
a future oriented strategy but failing to reward corresponding actions will create CEO incentives to concentrate 
on “wrong” activities, negatively affecting value adding innovation. 
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bonus contracts. This likelihood is the fitted value from a probit regression and 
incorporates the different matching attributes. I apply it as the criterion to match 
private performance measure users with similar firms choosing not to use these 
measures. In that way, the latter serve as control firms to indicate how private measure 
users would have performed in the absence of private measures.  
4.3.5.1 Prediction model for the use of private measures in annual bonus contracts 
In order to estimate firms’ propensity to include private performance measures in 
annual bonus contracts, I estimate a probit model where the dependent variable equals 
one if boards include private performance measures in the determination of CEO 
bonuses and zero otherwise. 
 Following previous research (e.g. Bushman et al. 1996; Ittner et al. 1997; 
HassabElnaby, Said and Wier 2003), I include a number of variables that influence the 
choice of private measures in bonus contracts, among which, variables capturing the 
expected innovation opportunity set, the informativeness of long-term oriented 
performance measures, firm size and financial health, the CEO’s long-term incentives 
provided by equity holdings, and the noise inherent in accounting numbers.  
 First, the strategy of a firm is an important determinant of the firm’s expected 
innovation opportunity set. Firms adopting a strategy aiming at long-term value 
creation attempt to identify new products and markets and need to quickly adapt to 
changes in the competitive environment, which positively influences the need for 
innovation (Miles and Snow 1978). Firms should therefore provide CEO incentives to 
take actions that correspond to the competitive strategy (Ittner et al. 1997). Following 
the defender-prospector categorization proposed by Miles and Snow (1978), I predict 
the expected innovation set and hence, the incentive benefits of private measures to 
increase the closer a firm is operating at the prospector end of the continuum. I 
compute the construct STRATEGY as a three-item factor score of a firm’s market-to-
book, employees-to-sales, and R&D-to-sales ratios. I use averages of these ratios five 
years prior to the proxy data; lower values are associated with firms near the defender 
end of the continuum. Principal component analysis reveals one factor with 
Eigenvalue greater than unity.  
 Second, the lengths of firm product development and product life cycles 
determine how well accounting earnings assess immediate effects of managerial long-
term oriented actions. Using the National Academy of Engineering classification 
(1992), I use two indicator variables that take on the value of one if a firm is 
characterized as having long product development cycle (D_CYCLE) and a long 
product life cycle (L_CYCLE), respectively. I expect that private performance 
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measures are more informative about long-term oriented CEO actions given longer 
product development and -life cycles.  
 I also include the firm’s financial stability using Altman Z-Scores (Altman 1968) 
averaged five years prior to the proxy data (ALTMAN). Financially distressed firms 
need to emphasize financial measures to direct managerial focus to the improvement 
of short-term profits to ensure firm survival, and therefore rely less on long-term 
oriented measures (Ittner et al. 1997).  
 Further, I include the variable EQUITY_INC described earlier in this dissertation 
to control for correlation between equity incentives and the use of private performance 
measures (Ittner et al. 1997).  
 In addition, I measure NOISE based on the variability in the median 3-digit 
industry accounting returns. Higher fluctuations in accounting returns of the median 
firm in a respective industry are assumed to proxy for the extent to which firm 
accounting performance is vulnerable to factors beyond a CEO’s control, increasing 
the contracting benefits of alternative performance measures (Ittner et al. 1997). I 
include the variability in ROA, ROE, and ROS over five years preceding the proxy 
data. Principal component analysis reveals one factor with eigenvalue greater than 
unity. I use the factor score as the measure of noise. 
 Finally, I include firm size (SIZE) to account for the firm’s overall monitoring 
environment, along with fixed year, and industry effects. I estimate the following 
probit regression: 
 
i
k l
lidlkik
iii
iiii
YEARINDUSTRY
CONTROLSINCEQUITYALTMAN
CYCLELCYCLEDSTRATEGYPMUSEP
εδκ
λλλ
λλλλ
++
++++
+++==
∑ ∑
= =
10
1
3
1
654
3210
_
__)1_(
 
(4.5) 
The initial sample of R&D intensive firms reduces to 452 observations [273 (170) 
private measure (non-) users], because of missing information on variables included in 
equation (4.5) but not in equations (4.3) and (4.4).  
4.3.5.2 Parameter estimates 
Table 4.1 provides the parameter estimates of the prediction model of private 
performance measures in CEO bonus contracts. Significance tests are based on firm-
cluster standard errors. As expected, I find that the incidence of private performance 
measures is positively and significantly related to firms’ being positioned near the 
prospector end of the strategy continuum, the noise in accounting earnings, and the 
length of product life cycles. The likelihood of observing private performance 
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measures is negatively related to the degree of financial distress and stronger equity 
incentives. Finally, the model’s Pseudo R2 equals 19.98%. 
 
Table 4.1 
Probit Estimation for the incidence of private performance measures in CEO annual bonus 
contracts (n=452) a 
  
Variable Predicted 
Dependent variable  
P(USE_PM=1) 
STRATEGY +  0.28** (0.14)  
SIZE +  0.27*** (0.57)   
L_CYCLE +  0.93*** (0.25)  
D_CYCLE +  -0.018 (0.19)  
NOISE +  0.18** (0.11)  
EQUITY_INC -  -0.123** (0.05)  
ALTMAN +  0.03*** (0.13)  
Pseudo R2   19.98%  
aP(USE_PM=1)i=α+β1STRATEGYi+β2SIZEi+β3L_CYCLEi+β4D_CYCLEi+β6NOISEi+ 
β6EQUITY_INCi+β7ALTMANi +β8YEAR+ β9INDUSTRYi+ εi  
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively (one tailed, cluster robust 
standard errors reported in parentheses).  
Fixed year- and industry effects are unreported, as is the intercept. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
STRATEGY = The firm’s prospective strategy measured as a factor score of the ratios (1) 
research and development to sales (2) market-to-book value, and (3) the 
employees to sales; 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total firm sales (mio. US $); 
L_CYCLE = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm is classified as having long term 
product life cycles, 0 otherwise; 
D_CYCLE = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm is classified as having long term 
product development cycles, 0 otherwise; 
EQUITY_INC = The sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio to a 1% change in stock price; 
ALTMAN = A variable accounting for the firm’s degree of financial stability. Calculated 
using Altman’s (1968) financial stability model, values below 1.8 implying a 
high likelihood of firm bankruptcy; 
NOISE = The time series variability in median industry accounting returns measured five 
years prior to the proxy data. The factor score is calculated using variability of 
(1) return on assets, (2) return on sales, and (3) return on equity. Noise in 
accounting numbers is assumed to increase with greater time series variability 
in industry returns; 
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4.3.5.3 Propensity score matching method  
I use the fitted values from the probit regression to divide all available observations 
into ones that exhibit high and low probabilities of observing private performance 
measures in bonus contracts. Comparing fitted values with actual firm choices, I 
estimate the critical value (the value above which a firm is classified as a high 
probability firm) that minimizes the sum of Type I and Type II errors. At the cutoff 
value of 48%, the ratio of correct classifications is 70.8%. Taking the probability of 
48% as the benchmark, I assume that firms above that likelihood theoretically benefit 
from the incentives provided by private measures, while firms below do not.  
 In both the high and low probability group, firms may behave as expected or 
make surprising choices. Based on this, I classify observations into four subgroups: i) 
Firms that include private measures in bonus determination as expected, ii) firms that 
use financial measures only, but have the characteristics of private measure firms, iii) 
firms without private measures as expected and iv) firms using private measures 
contrary to expectations. Subsequently, I match the groups of expected performance 
measure choices with comparable firms making surprising choices [i.e. i) with ii), and 
iii) with iv)] per proxy year, allowing a 10% interval around their adoption likelihoods. 
This identifies a matched sample for 89 observations of expected users and 46 
observations of expected non-users. Consequently, the subsequent analysis is based on 
270 matched observations (2*89 obs. + 2*46 obs.), as a result of the above described 
procedure.  
 As a final step, I perform t-tests to identify whether there are significant 
differences in the determinants of performance measure choices (defined in the 
previous section) across the matched samples. If the matching process is successful, 
there should be no differences in factors affecting propensity scores, rendering 
concerns about systematic associations between innovation and matching attributes 
void (Deheija and Wahba, 2002). As none of the determinants of private measures 
significantly differs (table unreported), the propensity matching procedure succeeded 
and differences in innovation performance can be attributed to the presence or absence 
of private performance measures.  
4.3.6 Additional controls  
In estimating (4.3) and (4.4), I further control for barriers to entry and market 
structure, factors that potentially influence innovation but unlikely to affect the private 
measure choice. That is, the propensity scores do not guarantee firm comparability 
among theses factors. 
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 Market structure, and specifically the extent of competition, is assumed to affect 
firms’ tendency to innovate. In markets where sales are concentrated among a few 
firms innovation may be spurred as individual players are more likely to reap the 
profits from R&D investments made (Schumpeter 1942). On the other hand, less 
competition may also hinder innovation, because competitive pressures and 
consequently incentives to innovate are low. Following Holthausen et al. (1997), I 
measure competition density by computing a four-firm concentration ratio. The 
variable COMP_DENS is calculated by accumulating the sales of the four largest 
firms and dividing it by the respective total industry sales as defined by three-digit SIC 
code.   
 Barriers to entry refer to the overall capital intensity needed to compete in a 
given product market. In essence, the logic of how this factor influences innovation is 
comparable to the effects of competition, as firms operating in an environment with 
high barriers to entry may be shielded from external pressures, which allows them to 
profit from marketing its own innovations. On the other hand, this may create 
organizational “laziness” with respect to innovation. Barriers to entry are measured by 
computing the median capital expenditures-to-sales, R&D to sales, and advertising-to-
sales ratios for all firms classified by the same three-digit SIC code. Finally, these 
individual ratios are summed up to form the variable BARRIERS (Holthausen et al. 
1995). I formulate no directional prediction for the variables COMP_DENS and 
BARRIERS due to their alternative possible effects on innovation proposed by prior 
literature. 
 It is also noteworthy that firm size is commonly controlled for in related studies 
due to the potential effects of economies of scale or lacking organizational flexibility 
on firm innovation which may be captured by size (Schumpeter 1942; Holmstrom 
1989). However, firm size serves as a criterion in the above described matching 
procedure. This ensures that no systematic size effects are introduced when estimating 
regressions in the matched samples (Deheija and Wahba 2002). 
4.3.7 Descriptive statistics  
Table 4.2 summarizes descriptive statistics of all endogenous and explanatory 
variables in the innovation regressions (4.3) and (4.4).38 Pearson correlations reveal no 
sign of multicollinearity between the explanatory variables (Table 4.3).39 As noted 
above, all innovation measures are censored at the value 0 with non-trivial amounts of 
                                                 
38 To control for potential effects of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st, 99th percentiles. 
39 An exemption is the correlation between competition density and investment barriers, neither of these 
variables, however, exhibits noteworthy correlation with USE_PM, which is the variable of interest in this 
context.  
The Incentive and Signaling Effects of Annual Bonus Schemes 
77 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive statistics of Innovation and explanatory variables for matched observations  (n=270) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
USE_PM 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 1 
SIZE 6.8 6.99 1.38 6.02 7.87 
COMP_DENS 0.58 0.51 0.21 0.4 0.72 
BARRIERS 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.18 
EQUITY_INC 0 -0.21 1.49 -1.12 0.99 
ORIGINALITY 0.21 0 0.25 0 0.47 
GENERALITY 0.12 0 0.22 0 0 
IMPACT 0.32 0 0.58 0 0.37 
PATENT_COUNT 31.2 0 99.44 0 13 
The variables are defined as follows: 
USE_PM = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the board uses private information of 
CEO performance in determining annual bonuses, and 0 otherwise; 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total firm sales (mio. US $); 
COMP_DENS = Competition density. Measured by computing a four-firm concentration 
ratio. This is calculated by accumulating the sales of the four largest firms 
and dividing it by the respective total industry sales as defined by three-digit 
SIC code; 
BARRIERS = Barriers to entry new product markets. Measured by computing the median 
capital expenditures-to-sales, R&D to sales, and advertising-to-sales ratios 
for all firms classified by the same three-digit SIC code (Individual ratios 
summed up to form the variable); 
EQUITY INC = The sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio to a 1% change in stock price; 
ORIGINALITY = The mean originality of patents awarded to a firm in year t, where originality 
is the citation intensity of individual patents made with respect to prior 
patents, across technology classes; 
GENERALITY = The mean generality of patents awarded to a firm in year t, where originality 
is the citation intensity of individual patents received by later patents, across 
technology classes; 
IMPACT = The mean future citations received by firm patents in a given year; 
PATENT_COUNT = Number of firm patents granted. 
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observations, while being continuously distributed for innovation measures greater 
than 0, justifying the choice to apply the tobit procedure in estimating (4.3) and (4.4). I 
also assess whether patent characteristics in the employed sample are representative of 
overall innovation characteristics by comparing variable distributions to those reported 
in related studies. I concentrate on 207 firm year observations where 
PATENT_COUNT>0. The means and medians of the innovation variables as well as 
their significant skewness (i.e. much higher means than medians) are comparable to 
figures reported in earlier work (e.g. Pakes 1989, Trajtenberg 1990, and Trajtenberg et 
al. 1997). One notable exception is the distribution of the variable GENERALITY 
where even the third quartile exhibits the value 0, which indicates that the variable in 
the present sample is even more skewed as compared to prior work. 40 
                                                 
40 A potential explanation for this observation is that the time span after the grant date of an individual patent is 
relatively short in the present sample, which understates the amount of citations a patent may possibly receive in 
the future. Consequently, as the likelihood of receiving patents from more diverse technologies increases with 
more patents received over time, the limited time span underlying this study may result in generality scores that 
are different today compared to measuring the variable in future periods (see also Hall et al. 2001). However, the 
respective variable should still be informative of firm innovativeness as patents not only receiving early citations 
but also from a broad set of technologies are inherently important. That is, innovation gaps observed among 
relatively young patents can be expected to widen over time (Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002). 
 
Table 4.3 
Pearson correlation coefficients between the independent variables (n=270) 
Variable USE_PM SIZE COMP_DENS BARRIERS EQUITY_INC 
USE_PM 1.00     
SIZE -0.03 1.00    
COMP_DENS -0.05 0.2* 1.00   
BARRIERS 0 -0.27* -0.63* 1.00  
EQUITY_INC -0.04 0.43* -0.16* 0.25* 1.00 
* Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level or higher (two-tailed). 
The variables are defined as follows: 
USE_PM = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the board uses private information of CEO 
performance in determining annual bonuses, and 0 otherwise; 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total firm sales (mio. US $);
COMP_DENS = Competition density. Measured by computing a four-firm concentration ratio. 
This is calculated by accumulating the sales of the four largest firms and dividing 
it by the respective total industry sales as defined by three-digit SIC code; 
BARRIERS = Barriers to entry new product markets. Measured by computing the median 
capital expenditures-to-sales, R&D to sales, and advertising-to-sales ratios for all 
firms classified by the same three-digit SIC code (Individual ratios summed up to 
form the variable); 
EQUITY_INC = The sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio to a 1% change in stock price. 
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 The skeweness of the variables indicates that most patents are relatively basic in 
technological terms, cite relatively narrow industry fields, and receive few citations in 
the first years after being granted (Trajtenberg et al. 1997). 
4.4 Results  
4.4.1 Innovation performance of anticipated (non-) users of private measures  
Table 4.4 presents mean innovation comparisons across the two matched samples. 
Panel A (B) features comparisons of expected users (non-users) of private measures 
with the respective matched control firms. Columns 2-4 present the raw means and the 
corresponding two-sample t-tests assessing mean differences. Columns 5-7 provide 
Least Squares Means and their difference across firms, where I control for the 
variables BARRIERS and COMP_DENS defined above.41,42   
 First, I turn to the differences between 89 anticipated users and the matched 
sample of surprise non-users. The t-statistics indicate that anticipated users experience 
significantly higher innovation, in terms of technical  sophistication and  future impact, 
 
Table 4.4 
Comparison of mean patenting activity of firms making expected, surprising choices with regard 
to private performance measures in CEO annual bonus contracts 
PANEL A: Expected private measure users (EPM) vs. surprise private measure non-users (SPM) 
(n=89) 
Raw Means Adjusted Meansa 
Variable 
(1) 
ENPM 
(2) 
SPMU 
Δ, Pr 
[(1)=(2)] 
(3) 
ENPM 
(4) 
SPMU 
Δ, Pr 
[(3)=(4)] 
ORIGINALITY 0.32 0.19 0.13 (0.0005) 0.32 0.19 
0.12 
(0.0003) 
GENERALITY 0.21 0.11 0.10 (0.002) 0.21 0.12 
0.09 
(0.0031) 
IMPACT 0.46 0.32 0.14 (0.07) 0.47 0.32 
0.15 
(0.06) 
PATENT_COUNT 54.46 38.59 15.78 (0.27) 52.5 37 
15.5 
(0.316) 
(Continued on next page) 
  
                                                 
41 In computing LS-Means, covariates of interest are set to mean values, applying equal weight to different 
response levels PRIVATE_PM=1 vs. PRIVATE_PM=0.  
42 R&D intensity is a component of STRATEGY. Its effects on innovation are consequently controlled for by the 
propensity matching procedure. This is also true regarding SIZE which is included in (4.5).  
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both comparing the raw and adjusted means. Means of the variable PATENT_COUNT 
do not significantly differ. These results suggest that the incentives to take long-term 
value related actions provided by private measures are associated with patents of 
higher potential future value, when performance measures are in line with the strategic 
and operational environment the firm operates in. By contrast, the absence of 
corresponding incentives is associated with less innovation.  
 Second, Panel B reveals no significant differences among innovation measures 
comparing 46 expected non-users with surprise users of private measures. That is, the 
provision of long-term incentives via private measures has no effect, if strategic and 
operational configurations do not require their use. Given that model (4.5) classified 
more than 70% of sample firms correctly, I conclude that boards’ reviews of CEO 
performance create, on average, incentives that work optimal for the firm. 
Table 4.4 (continued) 
PANEL B: Expected private measure non-users (ENPM) vs. surprise private measure users (SPMU) 
(n=46) 
Raw Means Adjusted Meansa 
Variable 
(1) 
ENPM 
(2) 
SPMU 
Δ, Pr 
[(1)=(2)] 
(3) 
ENPM 
(4) 
SPMU 
Δ, Pr 
[(3)=(4)] 
ORIGINALITY 0.10 0.11 -0.01 (0.79) 0.1 0.11 
0.01 
(0.85) 
GENERALITY 0.03 0.02 0.01 (0.82) 0.03 0.02 
0.01 
(0.72) 
IMPACT 0.16 0.12 0.04 (0.71) 0.14 0.11 
0.03 
(0.79) 
PATENT_COUNT 1.95 1 0.95 (0.96) 5.67 2.48 
3.19 
(0.87) 
a Least Squares Means adjusting for BARRIERS and COMP_DENS 
P-Values (reported in parentheses) are the likelihood of committing Type I error in rejecting H0: 
Innovation (Group 1) = Innovation (Group 2), using a two-tailed test. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ORIGINALITY = Average originality of patents in a given year. Measured as one minus the 
Herfindahl Index of the citations made to earlier patents across different 
technology classes; 
GENERALITY = Average originality of patents in a given year. Measured as one minus the 
Herfindahl Index of the citations received by future patents across different 
technology classes; 
IMPACT = Average number of future citations received by firm patents granted in a given year; 
PATENT_COUNT = Number of firm patents in a given year. 
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4.4.2 Regression results 
The above comparison of innovation measures support the suspicion of an 
endogenously determined private measure choice. In this section, I turn to the results 
of regressing innovation measures on the private measure indicator to estimate (4.3) 
and also include the interaction with CEO equity incentives to estimate (4.4).  
 The regressions are based on the matched sample of firms with high propensities 
to use private measures. As indicated in the mean analysis, innovation is a major firm 
objective of high propensity firms, while low propensity firms seemingly invest in 
R&D to obtain marginal developments not subject to the ownership protection 
guaranteed by patents. Therefore, including low propensity firms in estimating (4.3) 
and (4.4) is neither interesting nor informative because expected innovation does not 
change conditional on the use of private measures.  
4.4.3 Innovation regressions on indicator variable USE_PM 
Table 4.5 presents tobit results for model (4.3) regressing measures of patent output, 
technical sophistication and impact on the indicator variable capturing the incidence of 
private measures in boards’ evaluations of CEO performance, with and without the 
control variables COMP_DENS and BARRIERS. For all innovation measures in all 
specifications, the coefficient for the variable USE_PM is significant and takes on the 
predicted positive sign. That is, in a sample of firms whose boards should evaluate the 
CEO using private performance information, the firms whose boards actually do 
obtain significantly more patents of greater technological significance and future 
impact than firms whose boards neglect such information. 
 The results corroborate the findings of the univariate mean comparisons and 
again indicate that innovation is a positive function of the “match” between firm 
operational and strategic configurations and the CEO’s evaluation, and thus, incentive- 
structure. In sum, I find strong support for hypothesis 1.  
4.4.4 Interaction effects of private measures and CEO equity incentives 
The second research hypothesis predicts that private measures in CEO evaluations 
allow cash payments to signal private information about CEO performance to capital 
markets which leads to stronger innovation oriented incentives of CEO equity 
holdings. Model (4.4) therefore incorporates the interaction term of private measures 
and CEO equity, as the hypothesized conditional effects of CEO equity will, if present, 
be captured by the coefficient of the interaction term. Further, the variable 
EQUITY_INC is included in the structural model for the sake of consistency. 
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 Table 4.6 presents the corresponding tobit results, again ex- and including the 
control variables COMP_DENS and BARRIERS. Consistent with hypothesis 2, the 
coefficient of the interaction term takes on the predicted positive sign in all regressions 
and is significant for the count of patent awards and both measures of technical 
sophistication, both ignoring and holding constant market structure and investment 
barriers.  
 The adjusted R2 of all models including interaction effects are higher than the 
respective models excluding interactions as presented in the previous table (see Table 
4.5). That is, a given level of CEO equity incentives is positively and significantly 
associated with firm innovation, conditional on the use of private measures. Hence, 
supporting hypothesis 2, the possibility to communicate privately observed innovation 
to outsiders  increases  the incentive intensity provided by equity, as this  renders stock  
 
Table 4.5 
Tobit Estimation of the effect of private measures in CEO performance evaluation on innovation 
(n=178) a,b 
Dependent variable INNOVATION   
Variable Pred. 
(1) 
ORIGINALITY 
(2) 
GENERALITY 
(3) 
IMPACT 
(4) 
PATENT_COUNT 
USE_PM + .226*** (.065) 
.234*** 
(.685) 
.281*** 
(.111) 
.281*** 
(.111) 
.365** 
(.168) 
.378** 
(.163) 
67** 
(22.9) 
64.82** 
(28.8) 
COMP_DENS ?  -.262 
(.203)
 -.423 
(.336)
 -.562 
(1.63)
 -159.21 
(88.59) 
BARRIERS ?  -1.37** 
(.685)
 -.702 
(1.06)
 .296 
(.513)
 -219.52 
(283.03) 
Adj. R2  7.2% 8% 3.6% 3.8% 1.2% 1.7% 0.38% 0.6% 
aINNOVATIONi=α+β1USE_PMi +β2EQUITY_INCi+β2CONTROLSi +β4YEAR+ β5INDUSTRYi+ εi  
b Using a sample of expected private measure users matched to surprise non-users, with propensities to 
use as the matching criterion. The propensity score incorporates the factors STRATEGY, SIZE, 
L_CYCLE, D_CYCLE, NOISE, EQUITY_INC, and ALTMAN in order to hold potential effects on the 
use of private measures and innovation constant (for variable descriptions, see Table 4.1). ***, **, * 
denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively (one-tailed test for predictions, two-tailed 
test otherwise, standard errors reported in parentheses). Fixed year- and industry effects are unreported, 
as is the intercept. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
USE_PM = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the board uses private information of CEO 
performance in determining annual bonuses, and 0 otherwise;
COMP_DENS = Competition density. Measured by computing a four-firm concentration ratio. 
Calculated by accumulating the sales of the four largest firms and dividing it by 
BARRIERS = Barriers to entry new product markets. Measured by computing the median capital 
expenditures-to-sales, R&D to sales, and advertising-to-sales ratios for all firms 
classified by the same three-digit SIC code (Individual ratios summed up to form 
the variable). 
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prices more sensitive to CEO actions. Contrary to prior studies and consistent with the  
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prices more sensitive to CEO actions. Contrary to prior studies and consistent with the 
arguments set forth in this study, CEO equity incentives exert no direct effects on any 
innovation measure.  
 I acknowledge that a significant amount of firms is included in the panel of 
observations twice or even in the entire 1998-2000 sample period. That is why firm 
observations are likely to be dependent over time. Firm clustering can therefore be an 
issue, which results in biased standard errors and significance tests. Tobit does not 
provide clustering-robust standard errors, for why I re-estimate all regressions using 
OLS and cluster-robust standard errors to assess the sensitivity of significance tests to 
that potential issue. None of the conclusions changes as OLS leads to the same 
inferences. 
4.4.5 Additional analysis and economic significance 
An important question is whether the above presented incentive effects on firm 
innovation are worth the investigation in view of the economic consequences of more 
or less innovation. In the remainder of this section I will describe the approach taken to 
attach economic meaning to the above results, along with problems this approach may 
result in and potential remedies to these problems.  
4.4.5.1 Value implications of patent impact and truncation in IMPACT 
To investigate the economic significance of incentives in view of more or less 
innovation, I require an estimate of the value implied by innovation as measured by 
the innovation proxies used. Until so far, there is only one study I am aware of, that 
investigates the value attached to patent attributes by investors. Hall et al. (2005) show 
that firms’ market value increase by 3% with each future citation received by patents 
awarded to respective firms. This corresponds to the measure of innovation impact in 
the present study, allowing the imputation of the economic effects by using parameters 
found here and the Hall et al. market value estimator. 
4.4.5.2 Interpretation of interaction term in the Tobit model 
Another problem regarding economic implications is that Tobit coefficients are 
difficult to interpret at the margin which holds in particular for interaction coefficients 
(Wooldridge 2002). I therefore calculate marginal effects where all effects are 
evaluated at the mean and marginal effects of the interaction term are based on the 
The Incentive and Signaling Effects of Annual Bonus Schemes 
85 
cross partial derivative of patent impact with respect to USE_PM and EQUITY_INC.43 
The marginal effects reflect the change in future patent impact for a discrete change in 
the variable USE_PM and an infinitesimal change in each of the independent 
continuous variables.  
4.4.5.3 Results 
The results (untabulated) for 112 observations for 56 matched firms in the 1998-1999 
period confirm the expectation that truncation of IMPACT is an issue as the strength 
of results hinges on the time span in which patents may have possibly received 
citations by later patents. The coefficients on USE_PM and USE_PM×EQUITY_INC 
are both positive (0.29 and 0.11, respectively) and significant (p<0.01 and p=0.085 
respectively, one-tailed tests).  
4.4.5.4 Economic significance  
As revealed by the preceding analysis, the coefficient of the variable USE_PM implies 
that citation intensity of individual patents awarded to private measure firms is about 
one third higher in the time window until the end of the NBER data base in 2004. I 
apply this estimator to a 1998 example where an expected private measure firm 
obtains 40 patents in a given year as does a similar firm surprisingly not using private 
measures receives (about the mean values of the latter group, see table 4.3). In this 
arbitrary selected case, the firm providing incentives would have a market value which 
is about 34% higher than the firms of comparison due to the greater impact of 
innovations, assuming that each patent citation received is associated with 3% higher 
market value (0.29*40*3%=34.8%). Next, the coefficient of the interaction term 
predicts that a given level of CEO equity is associated with additional 0.11 citations 
received per patent, conditional on the presence of private measures.  
 Again, applying this estimate to the example above and assuming that equity 
incentives in the matched sample do not systematically differ, shows that the incentive 
firm’s market value exceeds the comparison firm’s value by another 13%, due to the 
additional incentives provided by CEO equity (40*0.11*3%=13.2%). The effects 
provided by this example appear high at first glance. Still, economic effects remain 
significant even if a conservative 1% instead of the 3% estimator derived in Hall et al. 
is applied (11.6% higher market value due to the main effect on USE_PM, 4% due to 
the interaction effect). Overall, the admittedly simplistic example gives at least a crude 
                                                 
43 This procedure is similar to the one described by Ai and Norton (2002) with respect to interaction terms in 
Probit and Logit regressions. 
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approximation of the value relevance of CEO innovation oriented incentives provided 
by boards and their evaluation of CEO performance on that dimension.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In the evaluation of CEO performance, private information held by board of directors 
about the impact of CEO actions on firm value is often present. Innovation is a major 
driver of firm value and boards frequently review and reward CEOs on such “soft” 
performance dimensions that are not instantly obvious to outsiders or captured by the 
firm’s accounting numbers. The evaluation of CEO impact on firm innovation is per-
se difficult and capital markets are unlikely to be sufficiently informed to perform this 
task very well. In this chapter, I argue that boards can add to the alignment of interests 
between firm owners and the CEO when they communicate desired standards for 
evaluating CEO performance.  
 Assuming that firms invest resources into R&D to identify innovative products 
and production processes, I examine in a sample of R&D intensive firms whether 
boards’ evaluation of CEO performance triggers innovative behavior when 
performance is assessed using privately held information the board gains from 
observing the CEO.  
 I further argue that cash payments carry private information from the firm’s 
internal environment to capital markets, which leads a firm’s share price and also the 
CEO’s equity holdings to become more sensitive to internally known value creation, 
such as the existence of high prospect innovations. I test the prediction that the 
incentives provided by a given level of equity holdings are stronger in the presence of 
private measures in annual incentive contracts, positively affecting firm innovation 
 Empirical results support these arguments. Controlling for the endogeneity of the 
decision to use private measures and holding R&D investments constant, the incidence 
of private measures is positively related to the number, technical sophistication and 
impact of awarded patents. I also find that the interplay of private measures and equity 
holdings is positively related to all aspects of innovation used in this study. 
 In sum, results indicate that the investment in R&D does not always yield 
innovation but that corresponding incentives positively influence this linkage. Boards 
play an important role in providing incentives to innovate as they observe the CEO 
more closely than outsiders. Thus, boards via CEO performance measurement and 
evaluation take an important part in the corporate governance process.  
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Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
This dissertation examined board evaluations of the CEO and their relevance for 
incentive contracting from two perspectives. Chapter 2 and 3 focused on the use of 
CEO performance evaluations and chapter 4 focused on their effects. More 
specifically, in chapter 2, I isolated determinants of board discretion in the annual 
performance review and evaluation, investigating whether optimal contracting, or 
alternatively, organizational power considerations underlie the choice to apply 
discretion. In chapter 3, I studied whether board evaluations provide CEO incentives. 
In chapter 4, I analyzed the decision-influencing role of board evaluations in the firm’s 
innovation process. In this final chapter, I review the empirical findings of each study 
included in this dissertation in section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents conclusions and 
implications. Finally, potential limitations and suggestions for future research are 
presented in section 5.4.  
5.2 Summary of empirical results 
The aim of the first study was to investigate the determinants of board discretion in 
CEO annual bonus contracts of U.S. publicly listed firms. On the one hand, discretion 
can add informational value to incentive contracts. For example, discretion allows 
boards to incorporate information about external factors beyond the CEO’s control 
and/or to determine whether her actions taken adequately respond to changes in the 
firm’s environment. On the other hand, discretion depends on the board’s subjectivity, 
rendering performance evaluations non-transparent, which facilitates the CEO’s 
opportunity to extract rents from the company. I examined which of the two views 
underlie the decision to use discretion. I drew on agency theory to characterize 
different ways in which discretion can be applied to improve incentive contracts. I 
emphasized two, largely unexplored, types of discretion, (1) discretionary bonuses and 
(2) implicit incentive weights on pre-specified performance measures. I advanced the 
hypotheses that discretionary bonuses are valuable when accounting performance is 
open to events beyond the CEO’s control, and that implicit incentive weights are 
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valuable when the CEO’s optimal effort allocation across different tasks is ex-ante 
unknown. I tested these hypotheses in contracting settings where either the problem of 
uncontrollable factors or ex-ante unknown optimal effort allocation is dominating. The 
empirical findings support both hypotheses as the use of discretionary bonuses 
(implicit incentive weights) is positively related to the firm’s accounting noise 
(environmental unpredictability). Furthermore, applying discretion is a non-trivial task 
requiring intense monitoring of the CEO by the board. Based on this, I hypothesize 
that boards are more likely to choose discretion as the remedy for expected contracting 
problems the more intense they monitor the CEO. Empirical results are in line with 
this expectation. CEO power considerations have no effect on the discretion choice. 
Overall, the results in chapter 2 indicate that boards of directors take care in the 
administration of annual bonus contracts as their design systematically reflects optimal 
contracting considerations. 
 In chapter 3, I examined the question why boards invest resources into the design 
and administration of bonus contracts if not for incentive purposes. Boards may very 
well delegate certain compensation related decisions to the capital market but still 
retain other important duties. For the CEO, one of the most important duties of the 
board concerns her employment and boards are likely to incorporate privately held 
information in deciding over continuing and terminating her position in the firm. I 
argued that boards use bonus contracts as a device to ex-ante convey what the board’s 
annual evaluation of the CEO is comprised of. This practice offers multiple advantages 
among which the credible communication of regular performance evaluation, and the 
disclosure of boards’ private information to capital markets. To test this expectation, I 
studied whether the incidence of CEO dismissal is related to the performance measures 
specified in annual bonus contracts. 
 In addition, CEO turnover provides information content to capital markets, due to 
the fact that boards may base the firing decision on private information. Unlike the 
case where the turnover decision is entirely based on public information such as 
accounting performance, a firing based on boards’ private information signals that the 
situation is worse than expected. I tested the expectation that stock price reactions 
around CEO turnover announcements differ conditional on whether or not private 
information becomes relevant in the annual review of CEO performance and thus, the 
ultimate decision to terminate her job.  
 Empirical results support both expectations. Controlling for market and 
accounting performance, I find that the board’s CEO performance assessment is more 
negatively associated with CEO turnover the greater the ex-ante weight on private 
performance measures in the bonus contract. Further, the stock market reaction around 
announcement differs according to the information signaled to the capital market along 
with CEO dismissal. Firings based on public information are followed by positive 
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stock price reactions while firings based on private information are associated with 
negative stock price reactions. Overall, the results indicate that annual bonus contracts 
provide incentives as they spill over to the CEO turnover decision and that board 
evaluations are relevant for investors in forming expectations.       
 After showing that boards’ performance evaluations are in line with economic 
rationale and provide incentives in chapter 2 and 3 respectively, chapter 4 examined 
their effects on management behavior. Boards observe the CEO regularly and are 
likely to learn about her value enhancing activities that have no direct effect on the 
firm’s accounting or stock performance. Innovation is a prominent example for the 
relevance of CEO information held by boards beyond that included in accounting or 
stock performance. Firms need to innovate to secure long-term profitability while both 
accounting numbers and stock prices fail to provide an accurate and timely picture of 
innovative efforts. In this study, I tested the expectation that boards’ evaluations of the 
CEO’s performance on dimensions that affect the firm’s long-term value creates 
incentives to innovate, for why I predicted a positive relationship between private 
performance measures in board evaluations and firm innovation.   
 Further, firms are likely to be reluctant to disseminate innovation related 
information to the capital market in detail, as this practice leaves competitors unaware 
of the firm’s future prospects. However, cash compensation to the CEO can carry 
internal information of value creation to outsiders who can react to this signal by 
adjusting the firm’s stock price. Due to this mechanism, the CEO’s existing equity 
holdings provide greater incentives to innovate as the stock price becomes more 
sensitive to value enhancing actions taken.  Based on this consideration, I advanced 
the hypothesis that the impact of CEO equity incentives on innovation is higher when 
innovative efforts are allowed to be signaled to outsiders via cash payments compared 
to a situation where this signal is absent.   
 The empirical results confirm both expectations. When boards monitor the 
CEO’s contribution to long-term value and use the information gained in evaluating 
CEO performance, the firm files higher numbers of more innovative patents. As R&D 
spending as an input factor to innovation is held constant, the results show that 
innovation is more than just a logical consequence of R&D investments, but that 
boards fulfill an important task in the innovation process by aligning CEO and firm 
interests by reviewing and rewarding corresponding initiatives by the CEO. Moreover, 
firm equity incentives are positively related to firm innovation when the CEO 
performance evaluation is conditioned on private board information, allowing cash 
payments to signal innovation to the capital market. This provides empirical support 
for the view that cash payments can be used to credibly signal news about internal 
value creation and that investors use the resulting signal to form expectations about 
firm value. Further, certain information can be too sensitive to be directly spread to 
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outsiders and the results indicate that combining CEO cash pay and equity holdings 
can enhance incentives. 
5.3 Implications 
The results of this dissertation yield implications for academics concerned with 
principal agent theory, financial investors, and practitioners in the field of management 
control.  
 Incentive contracts may result in different contracting problems that relate to the 
agent’s compensation risk and choice of congruent managerial actions. Different forms 
of ex-post flexibility and supervisor discretion related to how the contracts translates 
into rewards offer potential remedies for given contracting problems and theoretical 
agency research provides valuable insights into how this may be the case. However, 
earlier empirical work has to a great extent ignored the varying nature of the benefits 
provided by discretion, given alternative contracting problems at hand, thereby failing 
to support theoretical arguments. This dissertation took an alternative route by 
conceptually and empirically differentiating between contracting problems and the 
respective response offered by supervisor discretion. Specifically, important 
theoretical implications of the preceding work on existing agency theory are 
discretionary bonuses being used to reduce the risk born by the agent, and implicit 
incentive weights promoting situation specific adaptive behavior.  
 The results set forth in this dissertation further indicate that corporate boards are 
very well aware of whether or not they can improve incentives by applying discretion 
depending on the relative intensity the CEO is monitored with. On average, large 
boards and boards including busy members are aware that their CEO specific 
knowledge gained in the fiscal year is limited. In this case, improving the CEO’s 
performance evaluation by deviating from ex-ante specified performance measurement 
practices is economically infeasible due to likelihood of inaccuracies introduced in the 
process of evaluating the CEO. On the one hand, this result supports the view that 
certain board structures are inefficient in exerting corporate control, as intensively 
monitoring boards are able to provide more efficient incentives compared to less 
intensively monitoring boards. On the other hand, less intense monitoring does not, as 
one might expect, result in ‘chaotic’ compensation arrangements that facilitate rent-
extraction. On the contrary, respective boards recognize present contracting problems 
and choose transparent compensation contracts, which are economically optimal in 
that situation.  
 The preceding findings thus invalidate speculations about the ineffectiveness of 
corporate boards in fulfilling their given duties. Boards actively fulfill their tasks of 
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appointing, evaluating, and motivating management and this goes far beyond simply 
providing executives with firm equity and letting capital markets discipline them. This 
also adds to the ongoing discussion about justification of exorbitant wealth of top 
executives compared to that of average employees. The results indicate that CEO 
incentives systematically vary with economic determinants. Compensation received is 
thus predominantly performance driven and this is in the interest of shareholders. 
While this study cannot answer whether such income inequality is ethical or socially 
desirable, it suggests that it results from firms’ demand for managerial talent. 
 Underlying the preceding work is a situation of partial equilibrium, that is, the 
analysis is conducted using a subset of all variables that affect organizational design. 
This is important with respect to implications on optimal corporate governance in 
general and specifically boards’ monitoring intensity of the CEO. For example, a 
firm’s endowment can at some point in time favor board members with directorships 
in multiple firms, as a main objective may be the formation of alliances with other 
organizations. Such busy directors, in turn, can monitor the CEO less closely and 
boards consisting of busy directors can provide relatively inefficient CEO incentives. 
Yet, as the benefits of the firm being positioned in a strategic network will outweigh 
the net incentive losses, the actual board structure operates optimally. However, firms 
and their endowment are subject to constant change and board structures that may 
function in certain points in time can not live up to demands later on. In general, this 
dissertation confirms theoretical arguments for smaller boards including less busy 
directors being associated with closer monitoring of firm management, speedier 
decision making, and less difficulty in finding consensus. Boards of directors should 
exhibit structures that best fit primary organizational objectives and the recent 
tendency of downsized boards of directors for the above cited reasons support this 
view.       
 Moreover, directors gain more information of the firm’s prospects than the 
shareholders themselves. Share prices are consequently far from being perfect 
indicators of firm value, for example because firms are reluctant to disseminate 
competitively sensitive information to capital markets. In this context, chapter 3 and 4 
yield the following two insights. First, in making the decision whether or not to fire the 
CEO, stock performance is largely irrelevant as stock prices contain investor 
expectations but no information the board does not already hold. Thus, a firm’s 
deteriorating stock performance does not necessarily imply the present CEO to lack 
required skills, unless her main objective is to secure public accounting performance. 
The results further show that whenever boards promote future value creation, adhering 
to the present CEO is, in expectation, perceived as a positive signal. Investors are 
aware of the superior knowledge held by firm insiders and, as long as the CEO is in 
office, expect this being justified by unobserved but valuable actions. Conversely, if 
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CEO dismissal occurs, investors learn that their expectations were wrong and adjust 
expectations downward. Firing recently grew in importance as a mechanism to 
discipline CEOs, and this dissertation shows that investors should and, on average, do 
distinguish between value implications that it brings along.  
 Second, board evaluations translate into cash compensation, which can 
consequently be below or exceed levels justified by accounting performance. In that 
way boards can use cash compensation as an alternative to release value relevant 
information, as it allows insights into the outcome of CEO performance evaluation. 
Again, the above presented findings show that investors acknowledge the information 
content provided by cash payments and use it to form expectations of firm prospects. 
The results presented in chapter 4 are further interesting because they show that this 
mechanism enhances the incentives provided by CEO holdings of firm equity. As 
noted above, using the share price to evaluate CEO performance comes with 
disadvantages as it contains noisy investor expectations. Still, firms may have motives 
to provide managers with equity for other reasons than incentives in the first place. For 
instance, firms may have to provide incumbent CEOs with percentages of stock that 
are common in the respective labor market for executives, consider tax consequences, 
or grant time vesting stock options to achieve management retention. Given such 
alternative motives, the present results imply that the additional information included 
in cash payments render stock prices more sensitive to management initiatives and 
thereby increases the incentive value of given equity holdings. This allows insights 
into when combining CEO annual bonus programs and equity holdings can be optimal. 
 Lastly, conclusions of chapter 4 support theoretical arguments and are relevant 
for practitioners concerning the design and administration of strategic management 
control systems. Specifically, results indicate that firms whose incentive practices are 
imbalanced with economic determinants lack innovation, although their strategic 
orientation resembles that of innovation oriented firms. This suggest that innovation is 
not the mere consequence of investing into costly research laboratories and personnel 
but that incentives play an important role in turning investments into measurable 
outcomes. The theoretical arguments and empirical results presented in chapter 4 
strongly indicate that firms should achieve a ‘match’ between their strategic 
configurations and incentive practices.         
5.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
A problem potentially affecting all empirical studies in this dissertation is that of 
omitted variables influencing the dependent variable of interest and one or more 
explanatory variables alike. Accounting decisions made by firms are a consequence of 
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various organizational factors and controlling for all factors that affect such decisions 
is an extremely difficult, if not impossible endeavor. In this dissertation, the potential 
for endogeneity is most obvious in chapter 4, as decisions made with respect to 
performance measurement and incentives are influenced by the firm’s strategic and 
operational background, which also influence the firm’s innovation potential. Overall, 
I cannot entirely resolve endogeneity problems but believe that responding 
countermeasures are taken as elaborate as possible to ensure the validity of results.   
 The second limitation concerns the CEO as the level of analysis as the findings 
may not generalize to all hierarchical levels. Specifically, a crucial reason for the 
existence of boards is that shareholders need a supervisory body to evaluate and 
motivate capable executives, and a significant amount of board effort is allocated to 
these tasks. On the contrary, managers at lower hierarchies often supervise several 
employees, and supervision is but one of many tasks comprising day-to-day work. Yet, 
lower level managers observe subordinates’ actions on a more frequent basis which 
may favor the acquisition of the information needed to apply discretion in performance 
evaluations. Future research can address the tradeoff supervisors at lower hierarchical 
levels make with regard to the use of discretion in performance evaluation.  
 A further potential limitation of this dissertation is inherent in the selection of 
sample firms. For a firm to be included in the panel of firm years in chapter 2 and 
chapter 4, I require the CEO to be in office for the entire 1998-2002 period, as I am 
interested in firms’ contracting practices over a period in which the board and the CEO 
interact steadily to achieve optimal incentives. A possibility is that the reported 
findings do not generalize to firms outside this sample as their CEO evaluation 
practices do structurally differ. Future research can address the question whether 
boards’ CEO performance evaluation practices are different from the ones reported in 
this work, for example, in situations of frequent executive changes or incumbent 
CEOs. 
 In the study described in chapter 2, I argue that the use of discretionary bonuses 
is beneficial to reduce compensation risk borne by the CEO when accepting the 
contract. I test whether this argument holds by focusing on bonus contracts that are 
written on accounting performance only to see whether the incidence of discretionary 
bonuses is related to the accounting noise because a one-measure setting is the cleanest 
setting to analyze. Although the use of more diverse measure in addition to accounting 
measures offers per-se risk reduction benefits, as argued by principal agent theorists, it 
may be the case that discretionary bonuses are also used to reduce risk introduced by 
performance measures other than accounting ones. This dissertation ignores this 
possibility empirically but does so simply because an empirical proxy for the noise of 
such alternative measures is so far unavailable. In view of the attention of accounting 
researchers to aspects of alternative performance measures, a fruitful avenue for future 
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research is the identification of a plausible proxy for the risk introduced by 
performance measures that stem from the firm’s internal environment. If such a proxy 
is devised, future research can also address how firms attempt to reduce noise in order 
to improve incentives in a multi measure setting.  
 In the study described in chapter 3, I argue that retaining her position in the firm 
provides a strong incentive for the CEO as this secures future wealth. Apart from the 
firing decision, board evaluations of CEO performance can affect incentives if salary 
increases or stock option grants are related to how the board assesses the CEO’s 
contribution to firm value. Future research can potentially contribute by investigating 
how board evaluations spill over to other governance decisions. This effort would 
further add to the discussion whether boards effectively exert their duties with respect 
to the evaluation and motivation of key executives.    
 To measure the consequences of board evaluations in influencing CEO decision 
making in chapter 4, I use different patent based proxies for innovation. A potential 
limitation is that, except for the impact measure used, neither patent count nor 
technical justification measures are empirically validated proxies for firm innovation 
or value. On the contrary, one possibility is that these measures are mere artifacts that 
result from using different aspects of patent data that eventually result in varying 
measures but do not capture innovation as the underlying construct of interest. I have 
to rely on the innovation literature which assumes that the count of patent filings 
represents innovative effort and that technically sophisticated patents are both more 
innovative and valuable for businesses. The empirical results justify this choice ex-
post, as firms filing patents with higher future impact also tend to have more and more 
sophisticated patents. Future research can identify implications on innovation and firm 
value if the firm accomplishes to file greater numbers as well as technically more 
sophisticated patents.  
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Summary in Dutch (Nederlandse Samenvatting) 
 
Dit proefschrift beschrijft drie empirische studies met betrekking tot impliciete 
contracten voor beoordelings- en beloningsdoeleinden van managers. In brede zin 
bestudeer ik omstandigheden waarin een bedrijfseigenaar niet zelf de bestuursfuncties 
van een bedrijf uitvoert maar daar een manager voor aanstelt. Deze setting kan tot 
problemen leiden omdat de manager niet per-se gemotiveerd is om de gegeven 
functies zo goed mogelijk te verrichten en een meer gedetailleerde informatiebasis 
over het bedrijf heeft dan de eigenaar. Het is daarom belangrijk een oplossing te 
vinden om ervoor te zorgen dat de manager de door hem overgenomen taken zo 
verricht als of hij zelf de eigenaar van het bedrijf zou zijn. Economische theorie 
voorspelt dat door het contracteren op prestatiemaatstaven die een functie zijn van 
worden om doelstellingen van de organisatie te bereiken. 
 In dit proefschrift definieer ik, in brede zin, een impliciet contract als een 
contract waarin de bedrijfseigenaar, voor het begin van de te beoordelen periode de 
prestatiemaatstaven bepaald waarop de manager beoordeeld gaat worden, maar daarbij 
de optie open houdt na afloop van de periode zijn eigen kennis over het handelen van 
de manager tijdens de periode te gebruiken om de uiteindelijke beloningsbetaling te 
bepalen (vanaf hier aangeduid met "private information" of "private knowledge"). 
Deze praktijk baseert op private information en heeft belangrijke implicaties voor het 
bestuur van ondernemingen. Additionele informatie over de agent kan namelijk 
gebruikt worden om de interesses van de eigenaar en de manager beter op elkaar af te 
stemmen. Aan de andere kant kan deze vorm van betaling als ontransparant ervaren 
worden en daardoor problemen creëren. 
 Specifiek bestudeer ik het gebruik van impliciete contracten, die door boards 
gebruikt worden om de uitkering van korte termijn bonussen van Amerikaanse CEOs 
te bepalen. Hierbij streef ik drie doelen na. Het eerste doel is determinanten voor 
impliciete contracten in het beoordelings- en beloningssysteem te identificeren, 
waarbij onderscheid gemaakt wordt tussen verschillende manieren om impliciete 
contracten toe te passen om naar theoretisch voorbeeld, optimale prikkels te geven. 
Het tweede doel van dit proefschrift betrekt zich op de vraag of het algemene gebruik 
van variabele korte termijn beloningen in de VS überhaupt prikkels geeft en hoe die 
"goed gedrag", de manager, tenminste, tot een bepaald niveau, gemotiveerd kan 
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werking daarvan uitziet. Het laatste doel van dit proefschrift bestudeert of en ik welke 
mate impliciete contracten ervoor zorgen dat managers weten wat van hen wordt 
verwacht en dat ze gemotiveerd zijn om inzet te leveren aangezien dit tot een bepaalde 
beloning zal leiden. 
 In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik de determinanten van verschillende manieren om 
impliciete contracten toe te passen. Verwacht wordt dat bedrijven kiezen voor 
impliciete contracten als de beschikbare prestatiemaatstaven niet zuiver te meten zijn 
(ook aangeduid met "noise" in prestatiemaatstaven) of de operationele omgeving van 
een bedrijf onvoorspelbaar is (ook aangeduid met "environmental unpredictability"). 
In het eerste geval is het namelijk mogelijk dat een board na afloop van het jaar 
vaststelt in welke mate de prestatiemaatstaven door andere factoren dan de acties van 
management beïnvloed zijn. Hierdoor wordt de betalingsrisico voor de CEO lager. 
Deze reductie in compensatierisico leidt daarom, in theorie, tot efficiëntere prikkels 
voor de CEO. In het tweede geval kan de eigenaar het optimale handelen van de 
manager voor een te beoordelen periode niet precies inschatten. Daarom kan het 
optimaal zijn de manager ex-ante te informeren welke acties geobserveerd zullen 
worden, en toch het relatieve belang van acties in het bepalen van de uiteindelijke 
bonus achteraf vast te stellen. Deze praktijk kan ertoe leiden dat de manager gegeven 
de onzekerheid in zijn bedrijfsomgeving optimale acties kiest, in de verwachting dat 
dergelijk flexibel gedrag positief geëvalueerd en beloond zal worden. Ik voorspel 
verder dat een board de vaardigheid moet hebben om de additionele informatie goed te 
kunnen gebruiken, zodat impliciete contracten een positieve functie zijn van deze 
vaardigheiden en van de gegeven contractuele situatie (i.e. noise in 
prestatiemaatstaven, of environmental unpredictability). 
 De resultaten tonen aan dat bedrijven impliciete contracten gebruiken zoals 
voorspelt door economische theorie. De waarschijnlijkheid van het gebruik van 
impliciete contracten stijgt met de hoeveelheid noise in contracteerbare 
prestatiemaatstaven, bovendien bepalen boards het relatieve belang van 
prestatiemaatstaven flexibel als er meer onzekerheid in de operationele omgeving van 
het bedrijf is. Daarnaast tonen de resultaten aan dat boards die informatie over de CEO 
beter kunnen beoordelen in situaties waarbij boven beschreven problemen groter 
worden een hogere waarschijnlijkheid hebben impliciete contracten te gebruiken. De 
resultaten laten niet zien dat impliciete contracten vaker woorden gebruikt als de 
invloed van de CEO binnen de board toeneemt. De resultaten van Hoofstuk 2 laten dus 
zien dat optimal contracting theorie het gebruik van impliciete contracten verklaard. 
 In Hoofdstuk 3 bestudeer ik de invloed van korte termijn bonuscontracten op de 
prikkels die CEOs daardoor wel of niet hebben om bedrijfsdoelstellingen te bereiken. 
Recent onderzoek laat zien dat een groot deel van CEO rijkdom bepaald wordt door 
het bezit van bedrijfsaandelen. Dit toont aan dat boards een niveau van aandeel- en 
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optiebeloningen vastleggen, maar de CEO uiteindelijk door financiële markten 
geëvalueerd en beloond wordt. Een belangrijke functie van de board blijkt daarom 
uitbesteed te zijn aan aandeelhouders en investeerders, hoewel deze eigenlijk minder 
CEO gerelateerde informatie hebben dan boards zelf. Desalniettemin gebruiken alle 
bedrijven korte termijn bonuscontracten en de daarin verwerkte maatstaven sluiten 
meestal de aandelenprijs als prestatiemaatstaf uit. Verder laat empirisch onderzoek 
zien dat de beslissing top managers te ontslaan in grote mate gebaseerd is op winsten 
en accounting informatie en bijna niet afhankelijk is van aandelenprijzen. Dit toont aan 
dat niet alleen financiële markten de evaluatie en de beoordeling van de CEO 
overnemen, maar dat boards en de door hen gehouden informatie over de CEO een 
belangrijke rol spelen in het corporate governance proces. 
 In deze studie formuleer ik de hypothese dat korte termijn bonuscontracten voor 
CEOs door boards gebruikt worden om voorafgaande aan de te beoordelen periode aan 
te tonen welke prestatiegedeeltes en daaraan gerelateerde maatstaven gebruikt worden 
om de bijdrage van de CEO aan het bereiken van bedrijfsdoelen te beoordelen, en 
indien nodig, de beslissing over ontslag te kunnen rechtvaardigen. Dit biedt een aantal 
voordelen. Bijvoorbeeld kunnen boards op het beschreven manier geloofwaardig 
aantonen dat ze hun taken op een jaarlijkse basis uitvoeren. Dit maakt het verder 
mogelijk om op een zo efficiënt mogelijke manier formeel feedback aan te CEO te 
geven. Een ander doel van dit proces is dat boards gevoelige informatie aan 
investeerders willen verspreiden, zonder te gedetailleerde informatie te geven.  
 De mate van intern bekende informatie die gebruikt wordt om CEO ontslag te 
motiveren is verder belangrijk gegeven de reactie van investeerders op de 
bekendmaking van het ontslag. Ontslag kan namelijk primair gebaseerd zijn op 
publieke informatie en het feit dat de board zijn verplichtingen uitoefent is een goed 
signaal aan investeerders. Dit signaal zal een positief effect op de aandelenprijs 
hebben. Aan de andere kant levert ontslag dat door private information gemotiveerd is, 
in eerste instantie slecht nieuws op waardoor financiële markten negatief reageren met 
als gevolg een daling van de aandelenprijs. De resultaten van het laatste deel van 
hoofdstuk 3 bevestigen beide voorspellingen.  
 Concluderend kan naar aanleiding van de studie in hoofdstuk 3 gesteld worden 
dat ten eerste de specificatie van korte termijn bonus contracten significant gerelateerd 
is aan de manier waarop boards beslissen over het ontslag van de CEO. Dit resultaat 
toont dus aan dat CEOs prikkels ondervinden als gevolg van deze contracten. Ten 
tweede laten de resultaten zien dat financiële markten de prestatiemaatstaven van 
betalingssystemen gebruiken om de aandelenprijs te bepalen. Deze resultaten tonen 
dus aan dat de informatieomgeving van invloed is op ontslagbeslissingen en belangrijk 
is voor investeerders. 
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 Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de invloed van private information in korte termijn bonus 
contracten op het gedrag van CEOs. Specifiek onderzoek ik of het observeren door de 
board van CEO acties die op innovatie gericht zijn ook tot meer innovatie leiden dan 
in een situatie waarin deze informatie afwezig is. Innovatie is niet alleen belangrijk 
voor de groei van economieën als geheel maar is net zo belangrijk voor bedrijven die 
competitief willen blijven in de toekomst. Een belangrijke vraag is daarom hoe gedrag 
gestimuleerd kan worden dat op het lange termijn succes van een bedrijf gericht is. In 
de academische literatuur wordt vaak beschreven dat het geven van aandelen een 
antwoord is op deze vraag, ervan uitgaande dat acties die de toekomst van het bedrijf 
positief beïnvloeden ook in de aandelenprijs weergegeven worden, wat dus prikkels 
voor de CEO geeft om deze acties te verrichten. 
 Met betrekking tot innovatie kan dit problematisch zijn omdat financiële markten 
vaak niet helemaal geïnformeerd zijn over de innovatieve strategie die het bedrijf 
kiest. Vaak zijn bedrijven namelijk niet heel duidelijk over hoe zij op de lange termijn 
gerichte strategieën willen bereiken en welke trajecten gekozen worden om de 
bedrijfswaarde te verhogen, om concurrenten niet over strategische keuzes te 
informeren. Deze observatie toont dus aan dat boards en hun CEO gerelateerde kennis 
belangrijk is voor het creëren van prikkels, wat tot mijn eerste hypothese leidt. Zij 
voorpelt dat het gebruik van private information over op de toekomst gericht gedrag 
van de CEO in korte termijn bonuscontracten positief gerelateerd is aan de innovatie 
van het bedrijf.  
 Het meenemen van dergelijke private information leidt verder tot een 
betalingsniveau dat positief of negatief afwijkt van het niveau wat door publiekelijk 
observeerbare informatie, bijvoorbeeld winsten, verklaarbaar is. Dit betekent dat bonus 
betalingen die bijvoorbeeld hoger zijn dan wat het niveau van winsten voorspelt, een 
goed en geloofwaardig teken zijn voor investeerders over het verhogen van de 
ondernemingswaarde zoals door innovaties. Investeerders zullen dus positief op 
dergelijke positieve signalen reageren. Dit mechanisme leidt tot intensievere prikkels 
dan de prikkels die een CEO alleen door zijn aandelen en opties heeft, omdat hun 
waarde als gevolg van de positieve reacties van de financiele markten stijgt. De tweede 
hypothese voorspelt dus dat innovatie positief gerelateerd is aan het samenspel van 
private information in korte termijn bonuscontracten en aandelengerelateerde prikkels 
van de CEO. 
 De resultaten geven aan dat private information in korte termijn bonus contracten 
significant en positief gerelateerd is aan de innovatie van bedrijven. Verder vind ik, in 
lijn met mijn verwachtingen, dat het effect van toekomst georiënteerde prikkels van 
aandelen en optie paketten hoger zijn in de aanwezigheid van private information in 
bonuscontracten.  
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 Samengevat laten de resultaten van de drie studies zien dat het gebruik van 
impliciete contracten in grote mate verklaard kunnen worden door economische 
determinanten. Een belangrijke implicatie is dat flexibiliteit in het meten en 
beoordelen van managers gebruikt wordt om prikkels op een efficiëntere manier te 
geven, en niet, zoals vaak in de ligatuur beschreven, bonussen ongerechtvaardigd te 
verhogen. Verder is een belangrijke implicatie van dit proefschrift dat de beoordeling 
van CEOs door boards op gebieden die geen directe invloed hebben op publiekelijk 
beschikbare prestatiemaatstaven tenminste deels zichtbaar wordt in beslissingen die de 
board maakt in verband met compensatie en ontslag van de CEO. In deze context laat 
dit proefschrift zien dat investeerders belangrijke informatie uit deze beslissingen 
kunnen krijgen en ook gebruiken om verwachtingen over de waarde van een bedrijf 
vast te stellen. Het observeren van de CEO door boards en de daaraan gebonden 
prikkels zijn verder belangrijk om doelstellingen van de organisatie, in de vorm van 
innovatie, te bereiken. 
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